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TIIVISTELMÄ: 
IEC 61850 -standardi on otettu avosylin vastaan sähkövoimajärjestelmäautomaatiossa. 
Standardin ensimmäinen, vuonna 2005 julkaistu painos ei kuitenkaan kiinnittänyt 
huomiota sähköaseman tietoliikenneverkon redundanttisiin kommunikaatioratkaisuihin. 
Myöhemmin julkaistut standardilaajennukset korjasivat tämän epäkohdan ja viittaavat 
kahteen korkean käytettävyyden redundanssiprotokollaan, jotka löytyvät standardista 
IEC 62439-3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) ja High-availability Seamless 
Redundancy (HSR). Nämä kaksi protokollaa omaavat saumattoman (0 s.) tietoverkon 
korjausajan ja täyttävät vaativimmatkin sähköaseman tietoliikenneverkolle asetetut 
edellytykset. 
Tässä diplomityössä on tutkittu näitä kahta redundanssiprotokollaa, niiden käyttöä ja 
mahdollisuuksia sähköasema-automaatiossa. Työssä on ensin esitelty IEC 61850 
ominaisuuksia lyhyesti ja sen jälkeen kerrottu sähköaseman tietoliikenneverkosta, 
verkkotopologioista sekä tällä hetkellä käytössä olevista redundanssiprotokollista. 
Tämän jälkeen on tarkasteltu tarkemmin protokollia PRP ja HSR. Työn teoreettista osaa 
on täydennetty testausosiolla, jossa PRP:n toimintaa on tutkittu ABB:n suojareleillä. 
Testausosiossa on esitetty yleisiä näkökohtia ja selvitetty mahdollisia ongelmia, jotka on 
hyvä ottaa huomioon rakennettaessa kyseistä järjestelmää sekä tutkittu, onko ABB:n 
PRP-implementaatio standardin IEC 62439-3 mukainen. 
Tämän diplomityön tavoitteena oli kerätä informaatiota ja kokemusta standardin IEC 
62439-3 korkean käytettävyyden redundanssiprotokollista, sillä niitä tullaan vähitellen 
käyttämään kohdeyrityksen projekteissa. Testaus osoitti, että tämänhetkinen PRP versio 
on valmis käytettäväksi ABB:n PRP:tä tukevien suojareleiden kanssa. On kuitenkin 
huomattava, että PRP:stä on esitelty uusi versio, joka tulee vähitellen korvaamaan 
nykyisen version. Se tuo kuitenkin yhteensopivuuden HSR verkkoihin. HSR:ää ei löydy 
vielä markkinoilta, mutta sen odotetaan tulevan käyttöön lähitulevaisuudessa. 
AVAINSANAT: Sähköasema-automaatio, IEC 61850, IEC 62439, tietoliikenne, 
redundanttisuus 
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ABSTRACT: 
The standard IEC 61850 has been adopted with open arms by the power system 
automation market. The first version of the standard published in 2005 did not however 
pay any attention to redundant communication aspects of the substation automation 
network. The recent extensions to the standard however corrected this defect and bring 
redundancy into view, adopting two high availability redundancy protocols from the 
existing standard IEC 62439-3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-
availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR). These two protocols provide seamless (0 s.) 
network recovery times and fulfill even the most demanding requirements for substation 
automation network. 
In this thesis, these two redundancy protocols, their usage and possibilities in substation 
automation are investigated. At first, the IEC 61850 features, substation communication 
network topologies, and also the redundancy protocols and methods used today are 
presented. After this, the protocols PRP and HSR are discussed more deeply. The 
theoretical part is followed by a test of a system with PRP and ABB devices to give 
general notes and clarify possible problems when building such a system, and to 
investigate if the ABB PRP implementation is accordant with the standard IEC 62439-3.  
The objective of this thesis was to bring information and early experience about the two 
high-availability redundancy protocols, as they will be gradually introduced in the 
projects of the target company. The test confirmed that the current PRP version is ready 
to be used with the few ABB substation automation products that support it at the 
moment. However, a new version of PRP has been introduced and it will gradually 
replace the present version, bringing compatibility with HSR networks. HSR is not yet 
found on the market, but is expected to come to use in the very near future. 
KEYWORDS: Substation automation, IEC 61850, IEC 62439, communication, 
redundancy 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Functional substation automation is the backbone for a reliable and efficient power 
system infrastructure. It is needed for controlling, protecting and monitoring a 
substation. Substations are one of the most important components of the power grid, 
providing interconnection between power generation and end consumers through 
transmission and distribution networks. 
The rapid development of intelligent electronic devices (IED) and communication 
technology, growth of data amount, and interoperability between devices of different 
manufacturers have all brought stricter requirements for the communication inside a 
substation. The standard „IEC 61850 – Communication networks and systems in 
substations‟ standardizes the communication inside a substation while taking these 
requirements into account. It defines communication in electrical substation automation 
systems as well as between them. The implementation of the standard IEC 61850 has 
been rapid; it is becoming the preferred communication protocol in substation 
automation solutions. 
The reliability of the communication plays a great role in making the substation 
automation system operate properly. To make the system operation reliable and to 
increase availability, a redundancy method has to be used. Redundancy means spare or 
duplicate functionality, which allows the system to continue to operate without any loss 
of performance and availability during failure. The present solutions use Ethernet 
switches that reconfigure the network during failure, relying mostly on Rapid Spanning 
Tree Protocol (RSTP). However, the standard „IEC 62439 – Industrial communication 
networks – High availability automation networks‟ presents two redundancy protocols 
that handle the redundancy in the end nodes with two different networks, achieving 
seamless recovery time. These protocols are called Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) 
and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR). These two protocols are now 
included in the IEC 61850 standard and are potential redundancy solutions to be used in 
substation automation systems that require high availability. 
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1.1 Scope of study 
The objective of this Master‟s thesis is to investigate redundant IEC 61850 
communication aspects, especially the highly available network protocols PRP and HSR 
included in the IEC 62439 standard. The use of these two protocols in substation 
automation with IEC 61850 is clarified and some comparisons to existing redundancy 
methods are done. In addition, most common substation communication network 
topologies are presented, along with today‟s basic redundancy protocols. A test network 
with PRP is made and the communication is analyzed with network analyzer software. 
The material is mainly based on scientific articles and the standards IEC 61850 and IEC 
62439. The redundancy is handled only on communication protocol and media level. 
This thesis is made for ABB‟s Substation Automation Systems -product group, which 
supplies automation systems for substations as well as for other industry and utility 
processes. The typical project of this product group consists of designing, building and 
commissioning an automation system which includes supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) software to monitor and control the process. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of 7 chapters altogether. After the introduction presented in this 
chapter, the second chapter gives some basic information about the standard IEC 61850 
and its communication features used in power distribution systems. The third chapter 
focuses generally on substation communication network and reliability aspects, also 
presenting the most common network topologies used in substations. The fourth chapter 
clarifies redundancy protocols and methods that the present substation applications use. 
In the fifth chapter, the redundancy protocols adopted by IEC 61850 (Parallel 
Redundancy Protocol and High-availability Seamless Redundancy) are presented and 
discussed, currently standardized in the standard IEC 62439 part 3. The test application 
of PRP is demonstrated in Chapter 6 along with measurements and results. Finally, the 
conclusions of this thesis are drawn in the Chapter 7.  
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2 IEC 61850 STANDARD 
The standard „IEC 61850 – Communication networks and systems in substations‟ is a 
global standard compiled by IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission). The first 
edition of the standard consists of ten sections altogether, the last of which was 
published in 2005. Some of the sections are divided into smaller parts. The parts of the 
of the standard are presented in Table 1 below.  
Table 1. Parts of the standard IEC 61850. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 5). 
Part Title 
 1 Introduction and overview 
 2 Glossary 
 3 General requirements 
 4 System and project management 
 5 Communication requirements for functions and device models 
 6 Configuration description language for communication in electrical 
  substations related to IEDs 
 (7) Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment  
7.1 Principles and models 
7.2 Abstract communication service interface (ACSI) 
7.3 Common data classes 
7.4 Compatible logical node classes and data classes 
 (8) Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) 
8.1 Mappings to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 and ISO/IEC 9506-2) and to 
  ISO/IEC 8802-3 
 (9) Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) 
9.1 Sampled values over serial unidirectional multidrop point to point link 
9.2 Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3 
 10 Conformance testing 
 
Part 1 gives the reader the introduction and overview of the IEC 61850 and part 2 
includes only the glossary of terms. Part 3 gives the requirements for quality (reliability, 
maintainability etc.), specifies environmental conditions and references to other 
standards and specifications. Part 4 gives information about engineering requirements, 
system lifecycle aspects and quality assurance needed in system and project 
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management. Part 5 specifies the performance requirements for all different functions 
performed in substation automation system as well as for device models. It also gives a 
basic approach for logical nodes. Part 6 introduces the XML-based (Extensible Markup 
Language) Substation Configuration description Language (SCL) and IED 
configuration exchange between IEDs and engineering tools.   
Part 7 is an important part including an overview of communication principles and 
models, describing relationships between other parts of whole IEC 61850 as well as 
interoperability obtaining. It also gives information about ACSI (Abstract 
Communication Service Interface) and its services, describes common data classes and 
related attributes and gives definitions of data classes and logical node classes. Parts 8 
and 9 define mappings of services used for communication inside a substation and for 
transmission of sampled analogue values, while part 10 defines the testing for 
conformance. The standard has been extended and updated after its publication. The 
extensions of the standard are discussed in Chapter 2.3. (IEC 61850-1 2003: 23–25; IEC 
61850-5 2003: 8–9; IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 9; Sidhu & Gangadharan 2005). 
2.1 Objectives of the standard 
The scope of the standard in brief is to support the communication of all functions 
performed in a substation. There are three main objectives for the standard which were 
taken into account by the standardization group and that were described as the most 
crucial requirements of the market (ABB 2010: 8; De Mesmaeker, Rietmann, Brand & 
Reinhardt 2005):  
 Interoperability, which means the ability for IEDs to exchange information and 
use it for their own functions in real time, without need of protocol converters. 
Interoperability is required for IEDs from different manufacturers as well as for 
different versions of the same manufacturer. Interoperability has to support 
functions (protection, control, automation, monitoring, self supervision etc.) that 
are executed by IED software. 
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 Free architecture, which means support for centralized (e.g. Remote Terminal 
Unit, RTU) and decentralized system architectures. Because the standard is 
global, it has to support different operation philosophies around the world. 
 Long-term stability, which means that the standard is future-proof, not getting 
obsolete in the future as technologies develop. This is required from substation 
devices as well as from technologies that are used in a typical substation.  
The use of IEC 61850 is advantageous compared to legacy protocols due to objectives 
mentioned above, but also bringing cost benefits in the area of system design, 
commissioning and operation.  
2.2 Communication features of the standard 
The most important communication features of the standard IEC 61850 are described in 
this chapter. The basic communication technology in IEC 61850 is Ethernet with a 
speed of 100 Mbit/s at the IEDs. (ABB Oy 2010a: 11) 
What makes IEC 61850 unique from the legacy protocols is the fact that IEC 61850 
provides a model how data should be organized in a uniform way in every power 
system device. Older protocols have only defined how the data is transmitted on the 
wire, thus leaving the engineers to manually configure objects and map them to index 
numbers, register numbers or other power system variables. IEC 61850 reduces this 
configuration effort dramatically. 
The other major approach that IEC 61850 takes is the separation of the domain related 
model for both data and communication services from the protocols. It can be said that 
data items and services are “abstracted” and are independent of the underlying 
protocols. The data objects and services are mapped to a protocol that meets the data 
and service requirements according to the standard. Because the development in the 
communication technology is quicker than the requirements in the field of substation 
automation, this separation enables the standard to be future-proof. Figure 1 shows the 
principle of this separation. (ABB 2010: 8–9; Mackiewicz 2006). 
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Figure 1. The separation between data model and communication stack. (ABB Oy 
2010a: 9). 
The standard is based on virtualization, which provides a view of real device and its 
aspects that are used for information exchange with other devices. The logical nodes in 
a logical device represent the functions of real devices, thus providing an image of the 
analogue world to the substation automation system. (IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 15). 
2.2.1 Data model 
The data model begins with the physical device, which is the device that is connected to 
the network with a network address (e.g. IED). Each physical device includes one or 
more logical devices, which are used to classify similar functions into different entities 
in the physical device. The physical device itself acts as a gateway for logical devices in 
it. Each logical device contains logical nodes (LN). (Mackiewicz 2006). 
For example, an ABB 615 Relion® series IED consists of three logical devices: CTRL 
(Control logical device), DR (Disturbance recorder logical device) and LD0 (Protection 
logical device), which includes also physical functionalities like inputs and outputs and 
the alarm LEDs (ABB Oy 2010b: 15).  
The approach of the standard is to break down all application functions into the smallest 
pieces that are used to exchange information and that can be implemented separately in 
dedicated IEDs. These entities are called logical nodes, which are virtual representations 
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of the real power system functions (for example, logical node XCBR represents circuit 
breaker). Nevertheless, the functions in the substation are not standardized, only the 
logical nodes and interaction between them is standardized as the main goal is 
interoperability. In addition, a logical node, based to its functionality, contains a list of 
data (e.g. position) which can be mandatory, optional or conditional. The data objects 
contain data attributes (e.g. status value, time stamp). (ABB Oy 2010a: 9; IEC 61850-5 
2003: 9, 25; IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 15; Mackiewicz 2006). 
Figure 2 represents the data model in the form of container (a) and hierarchical tree (b). 
Briefly, logical devices are a composition of logical nodes while logical nodes and the 
data are the main concepts that describe real system and their functions. (IEC 61850-7-1 
2003: 46–47). 
 
Figure 2. Data model of IEC 61850. (Gupta 2008; ABB Oy 2010a: 10). 
The data model is a virtualized model providing an abstract view of the device and its 
objects. This model is then mapped to a protocol stack based on MMS (Manufacturing 
Message Specification), TCP/IP and Ethernet in the part 61850-8-1. The mapping 
process transforms the model information into a MMS variable object, providing an 
effortless way to refer to the individual data. MMS is a protocol originally designed for 
manufacturing but it was chosen into IEC 61850 because it is the only public protocol 
(ISO standard) that supports the complex naming and service models of IEC 61850. 
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Every object has its place in the information tree (see Figure 2). Figure 3 shows the 
anatomy of the object name. The first part of the object name is the logical device name, 
which can be named freely (Relay1). The second part defines the logical node where the 
object is. In the figure, the object belongs to switchgear (X) and is circuit breaker one 
(CBR1). Logical nodes can be added with reference number to indentify nodes, for 
example XCBR1 from XCBR2. Also a prefix can be added. The separation mark „$‟ is 
needed for mapping over MMS-protocol. The logical node is followed by functional 
constraint, which groups the data into categories by their information type. After that 
comes the data part. In the figure, Loc defines the operation mode of the circuit breaker 
(local or remote) and stVal contains the status value. (ABB Oy 2010a: 10; Mackiewicz 
2006; IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 44, 79). 
 
Figure 3. Object name of IEC 61850-8-1. (Mackiewicz 2006). 
Every logical node is a grouping of data and associated services with name and relation 
to a power system function. The names of LNs begin with a letter that represents the 
group in which the LN belongs. There are logical nodes for switchgear that all begin 
with the letter “X” for example. Altogether, there are about 90 LNs defined, which 
cover the most common functionalities of substation and feeder equipment. The 
protection and protection related functions have been one main focus with 38 logical 
nodes. Table 2 shows the logical node groups and the number of nodes in them. (IEC 
61850-7-1 2003: 16; Mackiewicz 2006). 
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Table 2. Logical node groups. (IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 16; Mackiewicz 2006).  
 
Logical devices, logical nodes and data objects are all virtual terms, representing the 
real data used for communication. A device communicates only with the logical nodes 
or its data objects of another device. The real data represented by logical node is not 
directly accessible, which has the advantage that information modeling and 
communication does not depend on operating systems, storage systems or programming 
languages. (IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 9, 15, 57). 
2.2.2 Communication schemes and data model mapping 
IEC 61850 has adopted mainstream technology for the communication, which is based 
on the ISO/OSI-model (International Organization for Standardization/Open Systems 
Interconnection). The model presents the communication functions in seven layers that 
are: Application (layer 7), Presentation (layer 6), Session (layer 5), Transport (layer 4), 
Network (layer 3), Data-link (layer 2) and Physical layer (layer 1). Furthermore, the OSI 
model can be divided to two profiles: Application profile (layers 5–7) and transport 
profile (layers 1–4). The communication protocols that IEC 61850 uses are MMS 
(Manufacturing Message Specification) mapped on layers 5–7, TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) mapped on layers 3–4 and Ethernet that is mapped 
on layers 1–2. Figure 4 shows the OSI reference model. (ABB Oy 2010a:11; IEC 
61850-8-1 2004: 21–22). 
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Figure 4. ISO-OSI reference model with profiles. (IEC 61850-8-1 2004: 21). 
IEC 61850 offers three kinds of communication schemes and services. These are: 
 Client-Server communication 
 GOOSE messages  
 Sampled Values 
In Client-Server communication, the client request data from the server that offers it. 
The client may also receive report indications from the server (IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 
55). In substation automation system, this kind communication is used for transferring 
quite large amounts of information (can run to kilobits or megabits) and the 
communication happens vertically, e.g. between station level and bay level devices. 
This data is not time critical; it can be for example information exchange like fault 
record or event record etc. It uses the full OSI-model (MMS over TCP) with reliable 
data transfer.  
GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) messages are used for fast 
horizontal communication between IEDs. These messages are time-critical, including 
data like trip or interlocking commands, for achieving sufficient protection and control 
schemes. GOOSE messages are transmitted over Local Area Network (LAN) as a 
multicast, and the initiation for data transmission is executed only on occurrence of the 
event. 
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Sampled Values are also time-critical data. They are messages for instrumentation and 
measurement like sampled values of current or voltage signals from IEDs or non-
conventional instrument transformers. Sampled values are continuous stream of data, 
the size of which is defined by sampling resolution. These messages can be sent either 
as unicast (to one receiver) or as multicast (several receivers). (ABB Oy 2010a: 35, 54; 
De Mesmaeker et al. 2005; Goraj 2010a: 30; IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 41). 
Because of the approach that IEC 61580 takes, separating the data model and services 
from underlying protocols (i.e. using abstract models), the standard uses the concept of 
ACSI (Abstract Communication Service Interface). IEC 61850 defines a set of abstract 
services to be used between applications, allowing compatible information exchange 
between substation devices. ACSI provides a communication interface for these 
communication services, which define mechanisms for reading and writing object 
values and for other operations like device control. However, the abstract model needs 
to be operated over real protocols that are practical to implement and can operate in the 
power industry computing environments. IEC 61850-1 2003: 7, 18–19; IEC 61850-7-1 
2003: 49, Mackiewicz 2006). 
Figure 5 shows the mapping of data model and services in IEC 61850. The object model 
and its services are mapped to the application layer for MMS. GOOSE messages and 
sampled values are time-critical and thus mapped straight to the Ethernet link layer.  
 
Figure 5. Mapping of data model and services. (ABB Oy 2010a: 11; Brand 2004). 
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The mappings are defined in IEC 61850-8-1 (Client-Server and GOOSE 
communication) and in IEC 61850-9-1 and IEC 61850-9-2 (Sampled Values). (ABB Oy 
2010a: 11; IEC 61850-7-1 2003: 65; Mackiewicz 2006). 
2.2.3 GOOSE and Sampled Values 
IEC 61850 presents two real-time communication methods that can be used successfully 
in protection engineering: Generic Substation Event (GSE) and Sampled Values (SV) 
messaging. GSE messages are divided into two types: Generic Substation Status Event 
(GSSE) and to Generic Object Oriented Substation Status Event (GOOSE). The main 
difference between GSSE and GOOSE is the fact that GSSE is an older message type, 
which only supports data in form of binary-only. GOOSE is more flexible, supporting 
both analog and binary data. All new substation automation systems use GOOSE only 
instead of GSSE for horizontal communication. GSSE and GOOSE can both exist in a 
system, but are not compatible with each other.  
GOOSE, as mentioned before, is described as rapid horizontal communication between 
IEDs. GOOSE messages are mapped straight to Ethernet layer (layer 2), thus providing 
fast transmission of time-critical data. The messages are transmitted over LAN as a 
multicast, so the same substation event message is delivered simultaneously to multiple 
IEDs. The IEDs that are configured to receive the message can subscribe it.  
However, due to nature of the multicast and the design of the Ethernet, the messages are 
connectionless. This means that we cannot know which IEDs will receive the message, 
the message delivery is not ensured, and the acknowledgement of the successful 
receiving of the message is not sent by the IED. Because of this, IEC 61850 specifies a 
retransmission scheme, which increases the probability of successful reception in all 
subscribing IEDs. Furthermore, GOOSE uses periodic heartbeat messages to enable 
detection of link or device failure.  
Figure 6 shows the example of GOOSE message transmission scheme. In the figure, T0 
is the time between the heartbeat messages. As an event happens, a burst of messages is 
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transmitted, with gradually increasing time (T1–T3). Eventually, the time is settled back 
to T0. (Hou & Dolezilek 2008; Goraj 2010a: 30–32). 
 
Figure 6. GOOSE retransmission scheme during an event. (Hou & Dolezilek 2008). 
An interesting detail is that the signal exchange between bay level devices is not 
actually a new feature brought by IEC 61850. The legacy LON protocol already had a 
support for bay level devices to communicate with each other, for example interlocking 
and blocking signals between protection relays. (ABB Oy 2006: 3). 
The digital information exchange between IEDs and next generation voltage and current 
sensors is becoming possible. IEC 61850 defines Sampled Values (SV) for this purpose. 
Sampled Values are also mapped to the Ethernet layer (layer 2) being time-critical data. 
SV messages are used for transferring digitalized measurement values of current and 
voltage from switchyard to IEDs inside substation. The data collection (from current 
and voltage sensors) and digitization is made by a Merging Unit (MU), which sample 
the signals at an appropriate, synchronized rate. Like GOOSE messages, SV messages 
are also transmitted via LAN as multicast to any number of subscribing IEDs in the 
Ethernet network.  
There is an implementation agreement at the moment called IEC 61850-9-2LE (Light 
Edition), defining the base sample rates of the MUs. A sample rate of 80 samples per 
power system cycle (1/50 Hz) is used for basic protection and monitoring, while higher 
rate of 256 samples per cycle is used for high-frequency applications (e.g. power quality 
or high-resolution oscillography). Depending on the sample rate and the number of 
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MUs, a switch with speed of 100 Mbit/s or 1 Gbit/s is needed for process level 
communication. The process bus is discussed in Chapter 2.2.5. 
The sampled value streams that Merging Units generate must be synchronized in time 
with accuracy of a few microseconds. This is because IEDs use sampled values for 
protection, and they need to be in chronological order. Time synchronization in IEC 
61850 is discussed more detailed in the next section. (Goraj 2010a: 34–35; Hou & 
Dolezilek 2008; Mackiewicz 2006). 
2.2.4 Time synchronization 
In order to properly analyze the events and other data (e.g. post-fault data) in the 
substation automation system, events need an accurate time stamp (i.e. they need to be 
synchronized). Time synchronization is used for synchronizing all devices within the 
system. The time source is usually external (satellite or radio clock). IEC 61850 
presents five different requirement levels of time accuracy for time synchronization, 
ranging from 1 millisecond to 1 microsecond against real time. It also presents the 
protocol SNTP (Simple Network Time Protocol) for time synchronization accomplished 
via LAN communication. (ABB Oy 2010a: 10; IEC 61850-5 2003: 48–49, 81; IEC 
61850-8-1 2004: 89). 
SNTP is, as its name states, a simpler modification of NTP (Network Time Protocol). 
These two protocols differ in the areas of error checking and time correction. In 
addition, the SNTP uses only one time server at a time, while NTP uses multiple ones. 
They both provide synchronization over LAN. With SNTP, the system is capable to 
reach time accuracy of 1 millisecond. However, this is not precise enough for Sampled 
Values (of voltages and currents) needed for protection, which require an accuracy of 1 
microsecond. Therefore, more precise time synchronization methods must be used. 
There are two protocols that are capable of bringing higher accuracies: IRIG-B and PTP 
(Precision Time Protocol). (ABB Oy 2010a: 10; Spectracom 2004). 
IRIG-B (Inter-Range Instrumentation Group time code B) can reach an accuracy of one 
microsecond. It is simple to implement and is supported widely in devices. However, it 
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has a drawback; it needs a separate cabling from data network for all devices that 
require time sync. IRIG-B is widely used in today‟s applications that require 
microsecond accuracies. 
The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) standard IEEE 1588 
presents the Precision Time Protocol (PTP), which reaches accuracies of sub 
microseconds. PTP is very much like SNTP synchronizing time over LAN, but in 
addition it allows hardware assisted time stamping. A time stamp is added to the packet 
coming in the device and a correction is done when packet leaves the device. This 
allows high precision of time synchronization. On the other hand, devices need 
hardware implementation to support PTP.  
PTP was originally specified in the standard IEEE 1588-2002, followed by IEEE 1588 
version 2 in 2008 (PTPv2). PTP is advantageous to use in substations, because it 
eliminates the separate cabling of IRIG-B, achieves required accuracies in both event 
timing and critical applications like Sampled Values and eases the deployment of 
precision time networks in modern Ethernet-based substations. PTP is expected to be 
adopted by IEC 61850. (Moore 2009; Goraj 2010b: 3–4, 13, 29). 
Currently, switch manufacturers (RuggedCom, Moxa etc.) have some switches that 
support PTPv2, and GPS manufacturers (e.g. Meinberg) support it already. ABB IEDs 
will support it in the future, beginning from the transmission relays (Relion® 670 
series). There is no need to have accuracy of one microsecond in small substation today; 
it is needed when Sampled Values come into use. (ABB DA Online Support 2011). 
2.2.5 Substation automation system interfaces and levels 
The functions of a substation automation system refer to the tasks that are performed in 
a substation, e.g. control, monitor and protection of the substation and its feeders. 
Furthermore, there are functions needed for maintaining the system. In IEC 61850, the 
functions are assigned into three different levels: station level, bay/unit level and 
process level. Figure 7 shows these levels as well as logical interfaces (1–10) between 
them. The logical interfaces are explained in Table 3. 
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Figure 7. Substation automation system levels and interfaces. (IEC 61850-5 2003: 
15). 
Interfaces 2 and 10 are outside the scope of the first edition of IEC 61850 and thus 
marked with grey color in Figure 7.  
However, an extension to the standard (IEC 61850-90-1) defines the use of IEC 61850 
between substations, and another extension (IEC 61850-90-2) is under preparation to 
define IEC 61850 communication between substations and remote control centers (IEC 
61850-90-2 2010: 7). 
Table 3. The interfaces of substation automation system. (IEC 61850-5 2003: 15). 
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Process level functions include every function that is interfacing the process itself. They 
communicate via interfaces 4 and 5 to the bay level. The devices in the process level 
typically consist of remote process interfaces like intelligent sensors and actuators or 
I/Os (Input/Output).  
Bay level functions mainly use the data of one bay and act on the primary equipment of 
the bay. The communication within bay level is done via interface 3 while 
communication to the process level uses interfaces 4 and 5. Control, protection and 
monitoring units are categorized as bay level devices. 
Station level functions can be divided into two classes: process related station level 
functions and interface related station level functions. The former ones use the data of 
more than one bay or whole substation and act on the primary equipment of more than 
one bay or whole substation, communicating via interface 8. The latter ones are 
functions that enable the interface of the substation automation system to the local 
station operator HMI (Human Machine Interface) and to remote control center among 
others. The communication is done via interfaces 1 and 6 with the bay level, via 
interface 7 and via interface 10 (remote control interface to outside world). The devices 
in the station level include station computer, operator‟s workplace as well as interfaces 
to remote communication. 
The interfaces can be used to define two important bus systems or LANs: station bus 
and process bus. Station bus connects station level with bay level as well as different 
bay IEDs with each other and is thus combined with interfaces 1, 6, 3, 8 and 9. Process 
bus connects bay level with process level and its different IEDs with each other, 
combined with interfaces 4 and 5. Depending on the application, it can also use 
interface 8. (IEC 61850-5 2003: 14–16). 
The station bus connects all bays with station level, carrying information e.g. 
measurement, interlocking and operation. It has several benefits like GOOSE messages 
that use Ethernet network, thus reducing the traditional copper wiring. 
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The process bus is needed for sending sampled values from electronic instrument 
transformers to protection and control relays, and it also allows connection of intelligent 
switchgear (circuit breakers, disconnectors etc.). From the past to today, applications 
have used process interface hardwired to control and protection devices. These wires are 
used to communicate with the process: to get position indications from switchgear and 
analogue signals from current and voltage transformers. However, the process bus takes 
a step further, providing a digital link to switchgear and instrument transformers and 
thus reducing the copper wiring within the switchyard. Briefly, it replaces the copper 
wires with communication bus. Figure 8 shows a common example of substation 
automation system architecture using station and process bus and the three levels. In the 
picture, the rightmost process interface is hardwired to control and protection devices as 
made traditionally, while other process interfaces use IEC 61850 Process bus. (McGhee 
& Goraj & Moore 2010; Andersson & Brand 2000; Brunner 2010).  
Because the process bus is used to transfer continuous sampled values from the primary 
process, it has a significant requirement on the bandwidth. The process bus will use 
fiber optic cables. (ABB Oy 2010a: 35). 
 
Figure 8. An example of substation system architecture. (Schnakofsky 2011: 16). 
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The merging unit (MU) is a key element in the process bus, converting the voltages and 
currents of instrument transformers to an IEC 61850 messages and makes them 
available on the process bus. Switchgear can be connected to the process bus e.g. with 
distributed remote I/O units that use IEC 61850 communication. This interface is often 
called as breaker IED or BIED. The process bus thus carries current and voltage 
samples along with switch positions, commands, protection trips etc. between primary 
and secondary equipment. A trip signal can be transmitted from the protection relay to 
the circuit breaker e.g. using GOOSE messages. Figure 9 shows an example of the 
usage MU and BIED in the process level with Ethernet switch, thus forming and IEC 
61850-9-2 based process bus. (ABB Oy 2010a: 48–49; Brunner 2010). 
The exchange of information between process equipment and substation automation has 
high requirements for the real time behavior, especially in the area regarding protection: 
sampled values from instrument transformers to the protection relay and trip signal from 
the relay to the circuit breaker. This requires high-precise time synchronization. 
(Brunner 2010). 
 
Figure 9. The usage of MU and BIED on the process bus, connected by an Ethernet 
switch. (ABB Oy 2010a: 50).  
There are still very few real substations with digital IEC 61850 process bus. 
Manufacturers have already offered MUs as pilot products, but BIEDs are still rare. The 
high-precise time synchronization (1 µs) has been also a major challenge to this date. As 
a matter of fact, the IEC 61850 edition 1 did not specify the time synchronization for the 
microsecond requiring sampled values on the process bus. Therefore, user organization 
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UCA International defined an implementation agreement called IEC 61850-9-2LE, 
defining the formerly mentioned MU sample rates and time synchronization by pulse 
per second (1PPS), which requires a separate synchronization network. IEEE 1588 is 
expected to replace 1PPS, providing high accurate time synchronization over Ethernet 
and removing the separate synchronization network. (ABB Oy 2010a: 48–49; Brunner 
2010; Goraj 2010a: 35; McGhee et al. 2010). 
Although the term „process bus‟ refers to a separate communication network, it is 
possible to combine the communication traffic of station level and process level to one 
physical network carrying both of them. (Brunner 2010). 
At the moment, some of the ABB Relion® 670 series IEDs already support IEC 61850-
9-2LE process bus communication. It also allows mixing conventional wiring and fiber-
optic communication based on IEC 61850-9-2LE, which allows moving from 
conventional wiring to IEC 61850 digital process bus one step at time. (ABB Oy 2011a: 
5). 
2.3 IEC 61850 extensions 
The development of IEC 61850 is still continuing. Originally IEC 61850 was merely 
designed for substation automation systems, but it has been extended to other 
application areas as well. These include wind power systems, hydro power systems and 
distributed energy resources. Moreover, the standard has also extended to apply 
communication between substations as well as between substations and network control 
centers. The extension of the application range can be seen from the new title of the 
standard: “IEC 61850 – Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility 
Automation”. The usage of IEC 61850 in the area of distributed generation shows the 
significance of the standard for smart grids. 
In addition, most of the fourteen parts of the original IEC 61850 standard are also 
updated at the moment. They are revised, extended and then published as new editions. 
The part IEC 61850-6 edition 2.0 was published in the end of 2009 as the first part that 
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carries the entry of a new edition. Second editions of the parts try to solve remaining 
challenges from their first editions. In addition to correction of errors and small details, 
they contain new add-ons. These add-ons include clarification of unclear parts, data 
model and SCL extensions for communication between substations, data model 
extensions for new application functions, SCL extensions and implementation of SCL 
conformance and among others. They also add new common data classes, provide 
longer names for logical nodes (128 char.) and add new parts to the standard. 
Furthermore, the second editions of the parts IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-9-2 (station 
and process bus) bring also support for redundant IED interfaces, which are clarified in 
the Chapter 5. For clarity, it is recommended to specify the part and its edition when we 
talk about IEC 61850 in detail.  
The IEC 61850 extensions will be backwards compatible to the first edition of the 
standard. It is thus guaranteed that investments in products and solutions are secured 
and the customer or supplier will benefit from present and future advantages of IEC 
61850. The development of IEC 61850 will not decelerate in the future; there are task 
forces that have already begun working with parts that will carry the entry of edition 3. 
(ABB Oy 2010a: 48–51; IEC 61850-6 2009; Siemens 2010, Schwarz 2010). 
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3 COMMUNICATION NETWORK AND RELIABILITY IN SUBSTATIONS 
The real-time protection, control and monitoring functions of the substation automation 
systems require fast, highly reliable and deterministic communication networks. A 
deterministic network has predictable, calculable and consistent response time and the 
data transfers between end points within a guaranteed time. Moreover, the substation 
environment has to be observed: the devices must operate properly under substation 
conditions. This chapter focuses on communication network within a substation 
environment. In addition, some reliability aspects are taken into account. Because the 
architecture of the substation communication network is not standardized, the most 
common topologies are investigated in the Chapter 3.3. (Ali & Thomas 2010; IEB 
Media 2011). 
3.1 Ethernet and switches 
Ethernet is a mainstream technology, supporting CAT5/CAT6 cabling with both RJ45 
(copper) connector and fiber optics as well. When Ethernet is used in an industrial 
environment like a substation, the term „Industrial Ethernet‟ is used. Industrial Ethernet 
used in substations does not differ from common Ethernet in the standard level, but it 
requires additional features from the equipment in the area of reliability, redundancy, 
tolerance for substation environment conditions, suitability of power supplies and 
services that provide short response times. 
The choice whether to use fiber or copper in substation network can be difficult for the 
designer. Fiber optics has some technical advantages over copper like immunity to 
electrical interference and ability to be used over long distances as well as for 
bandwidth hungry applications like video streaming, but is more expensive than copper. 
The designer has to take into account cost versus reliability and criticality factors of the 
system to be protected. It can also be practical to make a compromise to use: copper to 
connect IEDs and switches within a bay and fiber to connect switches between bays. On 
stricter demands, it can be required that only fiber is used in the substation, excluding 
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station devices like station computers or gateways that are allowed to use copper. (Hoga 
2007; Moore & Goraj 2010). Using copper between IEDs and switches causes galvanic 
connection between IEDs and could theoretically cause a fault (e.g. surge) to spread 
over copper LAN to other IEDs and devices. 
Most substations do use combinations of fiber and copper cabling. While fiber is a 
preferred option (noise immunity) as transfer medium in a substation, copper cables can 
be used inside control room cabinets for short interconnections. However, a study made 
by EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) in 1997 tested shielded and unshielded 
twisted pair copper cables for the electromagnetic noise immunity. The study 
conclusion states that these copper cables are not suitable as LAN media in substation 
due to fast electrical transients, which have a harmful effect on the copper cable causing 
significant frame loss (e.g. 66% at 2 kV) which is unacceptable for real-time control. 
The study recommends that fiber optic media is used to connect all protection IEDs in a 
substation. Also the standard „IEEE 1615 - Recommended Practice for Network 
Communication in Electric Power Substations‟ (2007: 36–40) says that for 
uninterrupted communication during electrical transients, all communication links 
longer than two meters should be fiber. Furthermore, copper is not recommended to use 
outside of the substation control house. A conclusion for this topic could say that all 
connections that are exposed to electromagnetic interference should be fiber optics. 
(Madren 2004; Pozzuoli 2003: 24–25). 
Due to the nature of Ethernet, all IEDs using IEC 61850 have to be connected to an 
Ethernet switch. Because Ethernet is a packet based technology where IEDs can start 
transmitting data at any time, switches are needed to send the packets to desired 
direction and prevent collisions of these packets. The incoming packets are stored in 
memory and placed in a queue for the sending port, and the packet is transmitted as it 
reaches the front. This is called the „store and forward‟ process. 
A modern managed Ethernet switch (management processor inside) has many 
additional features to manage and optimize the network. These may include the 
following among others: 
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 Class of Service/Quality of Service (CoS/QoS) (IEEE 802.1p) to tag traffic with 
different prioritization levels. High real-time traffic has always the highest 
priority. 
 Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) (IEEE 802.1Q) to allow grouping of IEDs 
into different VLANs to segregate and secure traffic to different levels of the 
network. 
 Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) (IEEE 802.1w) to configure fault tolerant 
ring network, which configures itself during failure. RSTP is discussed in 
Chapter 4.1. 
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to manage and monitor devices 
in the network. 
 Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and Multiple MAC Registration 
Protocol (MMRP) to support and manage multicasting. 
 Link Aggregation to increase bandwidth and redundancy between devices. Link 
Aggregation is discussed in Chapter 4.2. 
 Port mirroring, user interface and cyber security functions.       
(Ali & Thomas 2010; Moore & Goraj 2010; Pozzuoli & Moore 2006)  
3.2 Reliability requirements 
IEC 61850-3 defines requirements for substation communication. It states that the 
substation must remain operable in case of failure of a communication component. 
Furthermore, the failure should not result in multiple component failures or cause 
undetected loss of functions. It is therefore reasonable to maintain adequate local 
supervision and control. It depends on the application if some special arrangements are 
needed in the substation automation system. 
In case of redundant communication elements, a failure that could disable both 
redundant elements must not exist (they should be powered from independent power 
sources). Redundancy is not mandatory for the communication system, though. It 
depends on the importance of the substation and the consequences of an outage. 
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However, the communication network failure does not stop the protection at the IED 
level, but GOOSE messages will fail since the network is not available (Kirrmann et al. 
2008). 
There must not be any single point of failure that will result in a non-operable 
substation. In addition, a failure resulting in undesired control action of the system (e.g. 
tripping, circuit breaker closing) shall not occur. The failures of a substation automation 
system must not disable local metering and local control functions in the substation. 
These requirements are crucial especially for the process bus, and can be one reason 
why it has not yet become common in substation automation. However, these 
requirements can be fulfilled with the seamless redundancy protocols handled in 
Chapter 5. 
IEC 61850-3 refers to standard IEC 60870-4 for further and more detailed reliability 
and performance requirements as well as availability requirements. (IEC 61850-3 2002: 
13).  
From the substation environment‟s point of view, the key issues that can affect network 
performance in substation can be divided to EMI (Electromagnetic interference) 
phenomena and environmental conditions. Environmental conditions include climatic, 
mechanical and other non-electrical influences. There are requirements for temperature, 
humidity, barometric pressure, mechanical and seismic and pollution and corrosion 
influences among others. IEC 61850-3 refers to standards IEC 60870-2-2 and 60694 for 
detailed information for requirements. Network equipment is needed to be „substation 
hardened‟ to withstand these conditions. (IEC 61850-3 2002: 17–19; Pozzuoli & Moore 
2006). 
Also the IEEE standard 1613 gives requirements for environment and EMI immunity 
for equipment inside substation (Pozzuoli & Moore 2006). Devices certified for both 
IEC 61850-3 and IEEE 1613 are guaranteed for reliable and solid performance inside 
harsh substation environment.  
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3.2.1 Reliability and availability fundamentals 
Reliability is defined as the probability of a system performing its function over a 
certain time period. It is important to notice that reliability differs from availability. 
Availability defines the ability of a system to provide service whereas reliability 
measures the system ability to function without interruptions. In brief, reliability 
provides information of how often component fails while availability includes the 
downtime that failures provide. However, a system with poor reliability can have high 
availability if the restoration time is rapid enough (see equation 1). (Vargas 2000: 4, 9) 
There are three terms which are used in availability calculations: MTBF (Mean Time 
Between Failures), MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) and MTTR (Mean Time To Repair). 
MTBF presents the number of hours between failures. MTTF is a similar term to 
MTBF, describing how many hours it takes from a device to fail after it was put into 
service. MTTR describes the amount of time between network failure and restoration to 
proper condition, including detection, diagnosis and repair time itself.  
The terms MTBF and MTTF are often confused. Usually MTBF includes both MTTF 
and MTTR, representing the time between maintenance calls. However, if availability is 
high (MTTR << MTTF), MTTF is roughly equal to MTBF and it makes no practical 
difference which one to use.  
The availability of the network can be calculated as the ratio of uptime to the total time 
as the equation 
 AN = 
NN
N
MTTRMTTF
MTTF

               (1) 
shows. Here, MTTFN is the Mean Time To Failure of the network and MTTRN is Mean 
Time To Repair network. (Oggerino 2010: 11–12; IEC 62439-1 2010: 35–36). 
To calculate the availability or the MTTF of the whole system, the following equations 
in the Figure 10 are applied. 
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Figure 10. Availability and MTTF of different systems. (Kanabar & Sidhu 2009). 
The availability is often described with number of nines. For example, an availability 
percentage of 99.999 means downtime of 5.26 minutes in a year, while adding one nine 
(99.9999 %) equals yearly downtime of 30 seconds. An estimate is often made, 
presenting that after availability percentage of 99, every additional nine costs twice as 
much thus doubling the cost of the network. However, it does make the network ten 
times more available. (Oggerino 2010: 10; Vargas 2000: 7). 
Network supervision is a crucial element for gaining availability. It shortens the MTTR 
value dramatically, because the fault can be detected immediately. In addition, the self 
supervision function implemented in IEDs monitors the state of IED hardware and 
operation of IED system functions, thus reporting the operator of malfunction of the 
IED. The health status of the network(s) and the connected devices (switches, IEDs etc.) 
must be monitored to get the full benefit of redundancy, otherwise it will help little 
(ABB Oy 2009a: 4, 6; IEC 62439-3 2010: 18).  
Especially, the condition monitoring of the redundant networks is very important. When 
the failure occurs and redundancy acts, the network recovers but is no longer redundant. 
Redundancy must be restored and only condition monitoring will tell if the redundancy 
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has acted. Also, a fault may not cause malfunction right away, and this cannot be seen 
in unmonitored network. SNMP and possible IEC 61850 objects are good means for 
monitoring and supervising the health of the network(s) and devices. 
3.2.2 Failures and failure rate 
Another measure of reliability of the component is the failure rate, which is the inverse 
of MTBF. It describes the number of failures in a certain time (usually per hour). The 
failure rate of a component usually changes during its lifetime but it can be assumed to 
be constant due to small variance. However, the detailed failure rate of components 
follow the diagram known as the „bathtub curve‟ as shown in Figure 11, describing the 
relative failure rate over time.  
 
Figure 11. Failure rate over operating time a.k.a. the „bathtub curve‟ (Vargas 2000: 6). 
The „bathtub curve‟ divides the lifetime of a population of electronic components into 
three regions: early life, useful life and wear-out period. The failure rate in the early life 
region is higher due to infant mortality phenomenon, where manufacturing errors as 
well as other defects take place. After that, the failure rate remains constant and only 
random failures happen. In the wear-out period, failure rate raises because the lifetime 
of components is coming to an end, i.e. are starting to wear out. (Vargas 2000: 5–6). 
The „bathtub curve‟ does not describe the failure rate of a single item, but an entire 
population of items over time. It is used as visual model to demonstrate the three 
periods of the product failures; not to determine the exact and expected behavior of one 
product family. (Wilkins 2002). 
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The failures of substation automation components can be classified to internal device 
and link failures and to external causes. The former ones include device failures, 
resulting in loss of power supply, processing electronics or communication ports. 
Usually the user experiences application losses, like losing access to the whole 
substation automation system via HMI or NCC (Network Control Center), losing the 
access to one single bay or to an individual IED. Most of these losses are constant and 
need repairing, but some can be temporary and the system can recover from these 
failures, for example by means of redundancy.  
The latter ones include failures that are caused by external influences. Components of 
the system as well as communication links can be destroyed for example of careless 
action of a service man. (Andersson, Brand, Brunner & Wimmer 2005). 
As mentioned, a single point of failure is very undesirable because it results in failure of 
the whole system. It can appear because of design error or because of an external cause 
that disables also redundant elements, for example extreme temperature. (IEC 62439-1 
2010: 15).  
3.3 Communication network topologies 
There are many applicable network topologies that may be used in substation 
automation with IEC 61850, each of which provides different levels of performance, 
redundancy, availability and cost. The basic topologies are cascading, star and ring 
topologies, which are presented in the following sections, along with topology of ring of 
IEDs. 
3.3.1 Cascading (linear, bus) topology 
In cascading topology, every one of the switches is connected straight to the previous or 
next switch via one port. This architecture is simple and cost effective. The worst case 
delay (latency) that system can tolerate defines how many switches can be cascaded 
altogether. Delay will increase as the message gets transmitted from switch to another, 
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in addition to internal processing time. This has to be taken into account if the 
application is very time-sensitive. Figure 12 shows the principle of the cascading 
architecture.  
 
Figure 12. Cascaded topology. (Kanabar & Sidhu 2009). 
Moreover, this topology has a disadvantage of not offering any redundancy. A fault in 
the cascading chain will disable all connections to devices downstream of the failed 
connection, which gives a reason to avoid this topology. (Pozzuoli & Moore 2006). 
3.3.2 Star topology 
The most basic topology in switched networks is star topology. Here, every switch is 
connected to one central switch (backbone switch). This architecture offers the lowest 
amount of latency, since a message goes from switch to another only through the central 
switch. Other advantages offered by star topology are simplicity, easy configuration and 
scalability. However, redundancy is not available in this topology either. Moreover, the 
major drawback of this architecture is the fact that the central switch becomes a single 
point of failure. Figure 13 shows the star topology. (Pozzuoli & Moore 2006; Moore & 
Goraj 2010). 
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Figure 13. Star topology. (Moore & Goraj 2010). Picture edited. 
3.3.3 Ring topology 
The Ethernet ring topology with automatic reconfiguration during failure is the most 
common architecture for substation automation systems according to IEC 61850 (ABB 
Oy 2010a: 11). This architecture is similar to cascading topology; only one additional 
link is connected to close the loop between the last and first switch. Traditionally 
Ethernet switches have not supported loops because the messages would keep 
circulating in the loop, eventually eating up all the bandwidth. Nowadays switches are 
managed and include a redundancy protocol that provides the elimination of the loops 
and prevent infinite data transmission in the network. The most widely used redundancy 
protocol is RSTP (Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol), which also provides reconfiguration 
of network during failure. RSTP is discussed more detailed in Chapter 4.2.  
The ring topology brings some level redundancy which is seen as immunity to physical 
break in the network. The amount of switches that can be connected to the ring is 
defined by the redundancy protocol. RSTP limits the ring to 40 hops, which is a link 
from switch to another. It is important to notice that the more switches there is in the 
ring, the longer it takes to reconfigure the switches during failure. In ring topology, 
RSTP can provide reconfiguration time of 5 milliseconds per one hop, so the total 
reconfiguration time in the ring of 40 hops can be about 200 ms. Figure 14 presents the 
principle of ring topology. 
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Figure 14. Ring topology. (Kanabar & Sidhu 2009). 
The ring topology does not improve any network latency while it is similar to cascading 
topology. However, managed Ethernet switches utilize CoS (Class of Service) to reduce 
latency especially in frame queuing by setting different priorization levels for frames. 
(Pozzuoli & Moore 2006; Moore & Goraj 2010; Kanabar & Sidhu 2009). 
If IEDs are dual homed, the ring topology can be doubled, thus forming a redundant 
dual ring topology. This is presented in Chapter 3.3.6. 
3.3.4 Ring of IEDs topology 
The ring of IEDs is a very recent topology that is used in IEC 61850 based substations. 
Here, the IEDs have an embedded switch module, which may implement typical 
features of managed switches, for example RSTP for redundancy and SNMP for port 
supervision. The main advantage of the topology is the cost reduction by elimination of 
a number of communication links and standalone switches. (Moore & Goraj 2010). 
Some of the ABB IEDs also support this topology. The ABB Relion® 615 series IEDs 
offer a communication module of two Ethernet ports. This enables a self-healing 
Ethernet ring topology when used with managed switch with RSTP support. The switch 
handles the ring consistency by routing the data and correcting the data flow during 
communication failure, while the IEDs act as unmanaged switches forwarding the data 
traffic. This solution supports connection of up to 30 IEDs of 615 series in the ring. If 
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the application has more than 30 relays, it is highly recommended to form several rings 
of IEDs, with no more than thirty IEDs per ring. Figure 15 shows the topology of ring 
of IEDs. (ABB Oy 2010c: 20). 
 
Figure 15. Ring of IEDs with ABB Relion® 615 series IEDs. (ABB Oy 2010c: 21). 
However, at the moment this self-healing Ethernet ring with 615 series IEDs has some 
issues to take under consideration. There is no detailed documentation for this solution, 
no configurable parameters and no supervision for IED port status. However, the 
general supervision of the IED ring can be done by supervising the corresponding ports 
of the Ethernet switches via SNMP. Furthermore, the performance of recovery time in 
case of a connection failure is quite poor; it is in the range of few seconds. (ABB Oy 
2011b: 31, 78). 
3.3.5 Other topologies 
There are also many other topologies that can be used in substation automation. There 
are hybrid topologies like star-ring topology or meshed topologies, and topologies 
where IEDs use dual homing (IED is attached to network with two links). With dual 
homing, redundant star and ring topologies can be constructed, connecting the network 
interfaces of IEDs to two rings or two stars, where the other network can act as backup. 
All these topologies offer even more reliability and availability by tolerating numerous 
faults, but increase costs. Figure 16 presents some of these topologies. These topologies 
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are not investigated further in this thesis. (Kanabar & Sidhu 2009; Moore & Goraj 2010; 
Pozzuoli & Moore 2006). 
 
             a)                                b) 
     
        c)      d) 
Figure 16. a) Meshed topology, b) redundant ring topology, c) star-ring topology, d) 
redundant dual ring topology. Picture edited. (Hoga 2010; Kanabar & Sidhu 
2009; Moore & Goraj 2010). 
As mentioned, each topology has its advantages and disadvantages in the areas of 
redundancy, performance and cost. They are achievable through managed Ethernet 
switches that offer many features needed in substation automation, ring topology being 
the most common architecture used in the substation automation today. (Pozzuoli & 
Moore 2006). 
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4 PRESENT REDUNDANCY PROTOCOLS IN SUBSTATION AUTOMATION 
This chapter discusses present redundancy protocols and methods used in substation 
automation in brief. The de facto redundancy protocol used today is Rapid Spanning 
Tree Protocol (RSTP), which is an evolution of the older Spanning Tree Protocol (STP). 
There are also some proprietary protocols based on RSTP that manufacturers have 
developed. These protocols are investigated in the following sections along with Link 
Aggregation Control Protocol, which enables the configuration of multiple links 
between Ethernet switches to one single link. 
4.1 Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) 
The history of Spanning Tree Protocol begins in 1990 when it was published in the 
standard IEEE 802.1D-1990, designed for solving the problem of traffic loops. The 
main idea in the STP is to disable some links, forcing them in to a hot standby mode and 
thus making the network to form a topology of a tree. This tree connects every switch 
but eliminates the loops. STP has been proven to be a reliable redundancy protocol but 
originally it was not designed for quick operation. After a link failure, STP needs at 
least 30 seconds to restore the network, which is far too slow for real-time automation 
networks. In 2001, an extension to the standard (802.1w) was published, introducing 
RSTP, which provides a recovery time of a few seconds while adding some new 
improvements. Furthermore, the original standard has been published as a new edition 
(802.1D-2004), outdating the STP and reducing the recovery time of RSTP down to a 
few milliseconds. (Pustylnik, Zafirovic-Vukotic & Moore 2008). 
RSTP is layer 2 redundancy protocol, which provides network redundancy while 
preventing loops in the network. Spanning tree is formed when there are multiple paths 
or connections to different switches. It configures some of the links into blocked-state 
and in the case a network segment becomes unreachable, RSTP reconfigures the 
network and activates the blocked link or links. This all happens automatically, but the 
result depends also on defined parameters. (Midence & Iadonisi 2009).  
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There is also an extension to RSTP, called Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP), 
which allows multiple spanning trees in to the same bridged network by mapping one or 
more VLANs on to the network. (RuggedCom 2011: 99–100). 
4.1.1 RSTP operation 
The RSTP operation is based on role and state configuration of bridges and their ports. 
The RSTP bridge can be assigned with two roles; root or designated. A network has one 
root bridge, which can be seen as a logical center of the network. All other bridges are 
designated bridges. The ports of the bridges are assigned with state (describes the port 
state in relation to address learning and frame forwarding) and role (describes if the port 
is facing the center or the edges of the network and if it can be used).  
The port states are discarding, learning and forwarding. When the port is put to service, 
it will be in the discarding state, where it only looks for RSTP traffic in order to define 
its role in the network. When it is specified that the port will play an active part in the 
network, its state changes to learning. In learning state, the port learns addresses but 
does not transfer frames. The time it spends in this state is quite short. After this, the 
bridge changes ports state to forwarding, where it will also participate in frame 
transferring in addition to address learning. It can also change back to discarding, if it 
occurs that port is not supposed to be active in the network. (RuggedCom 2011: 95–96) 
There are five roles that port can be assigned to: root, designated, alternate, backup and 
disabled port. Every bridge except the root bridge has a single root port, which is the 
best (quickest) way to send traffic to the root bridge. A port will be assigned as 
designated if it is the best port to serve a LAN segment it is connected to. The alternate 
port is an alternate way to root port and will take its role if the root port fails. The 
backup port mainly acts as a backup for designated port and can exist if there are at least 
two links from a bridge to another. The port role can be also disabled if the port is not 
operational or is excluded from the active topology by management. (Ruggedcom 2011: 
96–97; IEEE 802.1D 2004: 139, 145). 
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Furthermore, a port can also be assigned as edge port in the case where it is directly 
attached to an end node (cannot form bridging loops, port state always in forwarding 
state). There will be no unnecessary topology change messages as the port will serve 
only end nodes. (Ruggedcom 2011; 97). 
The topology computation starts with defining the root bridge, which has the best bridge 
identifier. The bridge identifier consists of bridge MAC (Media Access Control) address 
and manageable numerical priority component (the lower priority, the better identifier).  
Every designated bridge has a root path cost value (for the root bridge this is zero). The 
cost is calculated as the sum of the individual port costs of the links between designated 
bridge and root bridge. The port with the lowest path cost to root bridge will become the 
root port (root bridge will not have root port). If the two ports have the same root path 
cost, the port with best port identifier is chosen as root port. This path cost value is the 
main metric when defining root and designated ports. Any operational bridge port that 
is not a root port or designated port is an alternate port, or a backup port in the case 
there are two or more connections from a bridge to another. Furthermore, every bridge 
on the network sends configuration messages called BPDUs (Bridge Protocol Data 
Unit). They include information about bridge and port roles, root path costs and data 
from the current topology among others. (IEEE 802.1D 2004: 138–139; Ruggedcom 
2011: 97) 
There is mechanism called proposal-agreement that takes place between RSTP bridges. 
It provides RSTP bridge to actively confirm that a port can change its state to 
forwarding, without the use of any network timers (like in STP). This brings faster 
configuration times. (Pustylnik et al. 2008). 
The alternate and backup ports do not participate in the network, so the active topology 
is based on root and designated ports. Each ports role can change if a failure occurs. 
Figure 17 shows the principle of the RSTP topology calculation. In the figure, case a) 
shows the physical topology and the case b) shows the RSTP active topology, where the 
tree is formed and loops are eliminated. Case c) shows the roles of the ports, where the 
roles of ports are presented as follows: Root port (RP), designated port (DP), alternative 
port (AP) and designated port with edge port configuration (DPE). 
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a) 
      
                    b)             c) 
Figure 17. Physical topology (a), active topology (b) and port roles of bridges (c). 
Picture edited. (IEEE 802.1D 2004: 140–141). 
4.1.2 RSTP performance considerations 
As mentioned, RSTP provides recovery from switch failures and link failures between 
switches. What comes to the network recovery time, it depends on the topology and 
RSTP implementation. For meshed topologies, RSTP may provide a deterministic 
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recovery time in the case of failure, apart from root bridge failure where recovery time 
is difficult to predict. Actually, the RSTP standard does not define recovery times for 
meshed topologies. Ring topology instead provides deterministic and calculable RSTP 
recovery time in all failure scenarios. (IEC 62439 2010: 44). 
The (worst case) recovery time of ring topology network using RSTP can be calculated 
using the following formula: 
 )(cov PALeryre TNTT  ,            (2) 
where TL is fault detection time, N is the number of switches in the ring and TPA is the 
time that it takes to perform RSTP proposal-agreement mechanism. Many vendors 
report fault detection times in the 5 ms range as well as the proposal-agreement times.  
Using the formula above, a ring of 10 switches has a recovery time of about 55 ms. 
RSTP can provide recovery time 5 ms per hop or less; even a performance of 2 ms per 
hop can be reached with today‟s high speed switches. However, in the case of root 
bridge failure (although rare), the recovery time doubles because it takes longer to 
determine and configure a new root bridge. Some vendors have implemented 
proprietary root failure improvements to reduce the root failure recovery times. Using 
the formula again with root bridge failure, the worst case recovery time of the ring of 10 
switches would be 110 ms. (DesRuisseaux 2009). 
The TL and TPA values used in formula 2 can however vary depending on the vendor, 
product or port type, so the network designer should carefully study the RSTP 
properties of the switches when choosing devices to network. For example, RuggedCom 
provides the following values for RSTP performance (Pustylnik et al. 2008): 
 TPA  = 5 ms 
 TL  = 4–6 ms for 100Base-TX and 100Base-FX links 
  = 20 ms for 1000Base-X links 
  = 700 ms for 1000Base-T links 
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As seen, different link types take different time for fault detection. The usage of gigabit 
Ethernet over fiber (1000Base-X) and copper (1000Base-T) multiplies the fault 
detection time of RSTP compared to 100 Mb Ethernet, especially with copper. Gigabit 
copper should thus be totally avoided in substation automation networks when using 
RSTP (see also Table 5). Furthermore, it has to be ensured that the switches support the 
latest RSTP standard IEEE 802.1D-2004 to gain the above mentioned recovery times. 
We can see that RSTP recovery time is not enough for the applications that demand 
seamless recovery time (0 ms), for example IEC 61850 sampled values on the process 
bus. This is why redundancy methods with zero recovery time are needed, and are only 
provided by Parallel Redundancy Protocol or High-availability Seamless Redundancy. 
(DesRuisseaux 2009, ABB Oy 2010a: 59). 
Furthermore, the network using RSTP can include not more than 40 switches. 
Proprietary extension RuggedCom eRSTP™ however allows a network of 160 
switches. (Pustylnik et al 2008). 
4.2 Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) 
The Link Aggregation Control Protocol originally defined in IEEE 802.3ad can also be 
seen as a redundancy method. It combines multiple physical network links into a single 
logical link, which increases both capacity and availability of the communications 
channel between devices. In addition, Link Aggregation (also known as port trunking or 
port bundling) provides load balancing, so that the processing and communication is 
divided between several links. 
Link aggregation prevents the interconnected devices from the failure of any single link 
between them. The failure of a link reduces the available bandwidth, but the connection 
remains between the remaining links and data flow is not interrupted. However, in the 
case of physical connectivity change, Link Aggregation must reconfigure the 
configuration. Normally this is done in 1 second or less. Link aggregation can be used 
with point-to-point links e.g. between two switches or between a switch and end station 
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(server, router) as seen in Figure 18. Aggregations among more than two systems 
(multipoint) are not supported. (RuggedCom 2011: 89; SysKonnect 2002: 5, 11–12). 
       
Figure 18. Link aggregation examples. The former one presents connection between 
switches and the latter one between servers and switches. The aggregation 
connection is ringed. (SysKonnect 2002: 7–8). 
The Link Aggregation requires all physical links to run at same speed, otherwise the 
performance will drop. The LACP configuration must also be done on both sides of the 
aggregated link. Especially, between switches the configuration must match or 
otherwise a loop can be formed. Layer 2 features like Spanning Tree treat a port trunk 
as single link. However, it shall be noted that RSTP is a superior way to handle 
redundancy between two switches connected with more than one physical link. 
Especially, if increased bandwidth is not required and RSTP is enabled, Link 
aggregation should not be used, since it may cause longer fail-over time. (RuggedCom 
2011: 90–91). Because of this, the most useful way to use Link Aggregation at the 
moment may be to gain redundancy between switches and end stations like servers, 
while RSTP handles the redundancy in the network. 
There are also proprietary protocols and methods that are enhancements over LACP or 
work as a proprietary option, especially in the server network cards. They are often 
referred as NIC (Network Interface Card) teaming. For example, Intel provides teaming 
software called Advanced Network Services (ANS) while Broadcom offers Broadcom 
Advanced Server Program (BASP). These softwares offer teaming modes that can 
include also Link Aggregation as defined in IEEE 802.3ad, but also proprietary modes, 
which may not even need support from the switch. These are however not handled 
further in this thesis. (Bhutani & Mahmood 2003). 
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4.3 Dual homing redundancy 
Dual homing (also dual link redundancy) can be seen as a redundancy method between 
end nodes (IEDs) and Ethernet switches. In dual homing, an IED has two separate 
network interfaces. One is active and carries the traffic, while the other one acts as a 
backup link. In case of a failure, the traffic is switched over to the backup link. The 
switchover takes time, but can be quite fast. Usually the dual homing is completed via a 
proprietary extension. Figure 19 shows the principle of dual homing of IEDs. During 
link failure, the backup link takes over the traffic. 
 
Figure 19. Dual homing example. (Hoga 2010a). 
A popular method is to mix ring redundancy and dual homing. The Ethernet switches 
use RSTP as the redundancy while dual homing brings redundancy between IEDs and 
switches. If the two links of IEDs are connected to different Ethernet switches, a switch 
failure can be tolerated. (Hoga 2010). 
The mode of the two ports can also be changeable. For example, Siemens Ethernet IED 
module EN100 can be set to use either dual link redundancy or to use switch mode with 
RSTP, depending on the wanted configuration and topology. There is also a possibility 
to use a proprietary ring redundancy protocol with Siemens IEDs. (Siemens 2009). 
The proprietary NIC teaming softwares presented in the previous section can also be 
used to gather dual homing in servers and workstation computers. 
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4.4 Proprietary protocols 
Many different Ethernet switch manufacturers provide proprietary ring-based 
redundancy protocols and extensions today. These are however vendor-specific methods 
and are not interoperable with each other. Table 4 shows a comparison of these 
protocols along with the standardized RSTP. 
It must be noticed that the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol defined in IEEE 802.1D-2004 
has equal or even better performance compared to vendor-specific protocols. It has also 
benefits like support for any network topology and interoperability. The vendors 
developed their own protocols since there was no standard protocol for industrial 
Ethernet redundancy providing sufficient network recovery performance. These 
protocols can be seen as proprietary enhancements to the older RSTP defined in IEEE 
802.1w-2001. In addition, some the public information regarding RSTP performance is 
still partly outdated, misleading to the older version of RSTP. (Pustylnik et al. 2008). 
Table 4. The features of RSTP and proprietary redundancy protocols. (Pustylnik et al. 
2008). 
 
However, lately these protocols have also evolved. For example, Moxa has released 
new version of Turbo Ring (V2), which provides 20 ms recovery time. The proprietary 
redundancy protocols are not handled further in this thesis.  
 53 
5 IEC 62439 – HIGH AVAILABILITY AUTOMATION NETWORKS 
The first edition of IEC 61850 did not discuss substation communication network 
redundancy methods or even Ethernet network topologies. As a result, manufacturers 
started to develop their own redundancy methods, thus threatening one of the main 
goals of the IEC 61850; interoperability. To prevent this progress, the standard IEC 
62439 was brought out. The first edition was published in 2010, specifying and 
standardizing several redundancy methods for industrial Ethernet that were originally 
developed by different manufacturers. IEC 61850 now adopts two redundancy protocols 
standardized in IEC 62439-3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-
availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) that will be discussed in this chapter. 
When choosing redundancy method, time requirements for station and process buses 
play a great role. Table 5 shows the time requirements compiled by IEC Technical 
Committee 57 Working Group 10. As seen, the process bus with sampled values and 
station bus used for busbar protection require seamless redundancy. Also the GOOSE 
messages require rapid recovery time. The zero-time recovery (seamless recovery) can 
only be fulfilled with PRP and HSR. Seamless recovery is especially crucial with 
process bus, because if even one sample is missing, the protection relay experiences 
measuring blackout. (Hoga 2010a; Kirrmann, Rietmann & Kunsman 2008). 
Table 5. Recovery time requirements defined by IEC TC57 WG10. (Kirrmann et al. 
2008). 
Communicating partners Bus Recovery time 
SCADA to IED, client-server station bus 400 ms 
IED to IED, interlocking station bus 4 ms 
IED to IED, reverse blocking station bus 4 ms 
Busbar protection station bus 0 ms 
Sampled Values process bus 0 ms 
                                 
Although RSTP cannot provide as rapid recovery times as stated in Table 5, it can be 
fairly used in station bus operating as single ring and limited number of IEDs. The 
station bus should preferably not carry time-critical messages. (Kirrmann et al. 2008). 
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The Parallel Redundancy Protocol (originally developed by ABB) brings a totally 
different view for redundancy compared to present redundancy protocols (that are 
handled by Ethernet switches in the network). In PRP, every device has two Ethernet 
ports that are attached to two independent networks. The message is sent simultaneously 
through both networks to the destination, which uses the first one and discards the later-
coming one. If failure occurs in one network, the data gets through from the other 
network with zero recovery time. HSR can be seen as a special case of PRP, bringing its 
principle into a single ring topology, where the two networks are treated as two 
directions in the ring and the need of Ethernet switches is eliminated. (Dreher 2011; 
Kirrmann 2011: 34). PRP and HSR are discussed in Chapters 5.2 and 5.3. 
 IEC 62439 standardizes also other redundancy protocols (Kirrmann 2011: 33–34):  
 Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP). MRP is based on Hirschmann-Siemens 
Hiper-ring protocol and can be used only in single ring architecture. It is a 
competitor for RSTP in ring topology. 
 Cross-network Redundancy Protocol (CRP). Originated from Fieldbus 
Foundation, the CRP uses (like PRP) doubly attached nodes and two LANs, but 
here they are interconnected. Only one port is active during normal operation.  
 Beacon Redundancy Protocol (BRP). BRP (originally developed by Rockwell) 
owns similar characteristics to CRP. It sends a beacon at short intervals to detect 
failures in the network. Only one port is active during normal operation. 
 Distributed Redundancy Protocol (DRP). DRP is originally developed by 
SupCon Group (China) and competes with MRP in ring topology. 
These protocols have worst case recovery times between few milliseconds and 1 
second. The comparison and performance of all IEC 62439 redundancy protocols can be 
seen in Appendix 1. This thesis does not handle these protocols further.  
An upcoming extension „IEC 61850-90-4: Network engineering guidelines‟ will include 
an overview of all relevant substation communication network topics (Hoga 2010a). 
Also, as the IEC 62439 is published, there is no need to use proprietary redundancy 
protocols any more in IEC 61850 based substation automation. 
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5.1 Redundancy classification 
Redundancy method/protocol can be classified depending on its type. IEC 62439 
presents redundancy as two classes, where every present and new IEC 62439 
redundancy protocol can be divided (IEC 62439-1 2010: 22; ABB Oy 2010a: 59–60): 
 Redundancy managed within the network (dynamic redundancy). The 
network offers redundant switches and links but the end nodes are attached to 
the switches through non-redundant links. In normal situation, redundancy is not 
active and the activation costs some time. Redundancy within a network is 
handled by protocols that reconfigure the LAN if a switch or link failure occurs. 
An analogy to the real world for this type of redundancy would be a car, which 
needs a spare tire after tire breakdown and changing it needs time. A typical 
example of this kind of redundancy protocol is RSTP defined in IEEE 802.1D. 
 Redundancy managed in the end nodes (static redundancy). End nodes with 
dual communication links (doubly attached node) are connected to two different 
networks and each node decides the network to use, or to use them 
simultaneously. The support for different topologies is good; the redundant 
networks can even have different architectures. The parallel operation of 
separate networks provides seamless recovery, which makes this kind of 
redundancy well applicable for time-critical applications. This class of 
redundancy costs about twice as much compared to the previous mentioned 
type, but the availability is high: the only non-redundant parts of the network are 
the end nodes themselves. An analogy to the real world for this type of 
redundancy would be a car with double tires; if one breaks, the car can still 
continue driving with one tire without interruption.  
Both PRP and HSR use the latter redundancy class; redundancy managed in the end 
nodes (static redundancy). Both the protocols provide that no frame loss happens during 
failure. However, devices (e.g. IEDs) need support for these protocols. Figure 20 
presents the principles of these two redundancy classes. The classes can be also 
combined in some situations. (IEC 62439-1 2010: 23). 
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Figure 20. Redundancy classes categorized in IEC 62439. (Kirrmann 2006: 21). 
5.2 Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) 
Parallel Redundancy Protocol is implemented into devices (e.g. IEDs). Every device 
that is using PRP is called doubly attached node implementing PRP (DANP). A 
DANP has two communication ports and is attached to two separate networks, which 
are operated in parallel. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 9). 
5.2.1 Operation principle 
The operation of PRP is based on frame duplication. The sending DANP sends the same 
frame simultaneously to both LANs, and the receiving DANP receives the frame from 
both LANs within a certain time. The frame that arrives first is consumed and the 
duplicate is discarded. An example of PRP network is shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Example of PRP redundant network with doubly attached nodes (DANP) 
and singly attached nodes (SAN). Picture edited. (Kirrmann 2011: 5, 10). 
As seen, the network is doubled in PRP redundancy. Any failure, even the total blackout 
of the other network, can be tolerated with zero recovery time since the message has 
two paths to the destination. The two LANs are considered identical, but can differ in 
performance and topology. Also the transmission delays can be different. There is a 
strict rule for the correct operation of PRP: the two LANs have no connection between 
them and must never be connected. (Hoga 2010a; Kirrmann, Hansson & Müri 2007). 
In addition to doubly attached nodes, singly attached nodes (SAN) like one-port IEDs 
can be connected to PRP network via two ways:  
 Connection to one LAN only. A SAN can communicate only with other SANs 
on the same LAN. A SAN is able to communicate with all DANPs in the 
network. 
 Connection through a RedBox. RedBox (Redundancy Box) is a device that is 
attached to both networks and acts like a DANP. SANs connected through 
RedBox can communicate to both LANs and to every SAN. The SAN behind 
RedBox appears as Virtual DAN (VDAN) to other DANPs. RedBox is 
discussed further in Chapter 5.4.1.  
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A SAN connected to PRP network does not need to support PRP in any way. SANs are 
devices with one communication port, such as maintenance laptops, printers, etc. 
Ethernet Switches in the PRP networks do not need PRP implementation (as they need 
in the case of RSTP) either, because the PRP redundancy is handled by the IED itself; 
not by the network (see Figure 19). Ethernet switches are considered as SANs because 
they are connected to one LAN only. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 12; Hoga 2010a). 
PRP cannot cover end node failures itself, since it is only designed to cover Ethernet 
switch failures and link failures, but it allows connection of duplicated nodes to the 
network, e.g. primary and backup protection relays. (Kirrmann et al. 2007). 
5.2.2 Node structure 
A PRP node (DANP) has two Ethernet network ports operated in parallel. The two ports 
have the same MAC address and present the same IP address. PRP is thus operated 
on layer 2 (like RSTP) and allows the usual operation of network management protocols 
as well as supports the time-critical GOOSE and SV traffic (Kirrmann et al. 2008). The 
use of one MAC and one IP address simplify engineering and especially, allow the 
operation of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) to work as in the case of a one-port 
node (SAN). ARP is needed for clarifying the correspondence between MAC and IP 
addresses. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 12). 
The main reason why the two LANs of PRP network must not be connected is indeed 
the same MAC and IP addresses of the two ports. Connecting the LANs will lead to 
ambiguous addressing and will trouble the network as a result. (Hoga 2010a). 
The most important component of a PRP node is a layer that handles the two ports and 
makes the PRP operation possible. This additional layer is called Link Redundancy 
Entity (LRE) and is inserted to the communication stack (OSI model) of a PRP node. 
The LRE has two tasks: handling of duplicates and redundancy management. 
Furthermore, it hides the two network interfaces from upper layers, presenting the same 
interface towards upper layers as a single network interface. This means that 
applications and software do not need to be aware of PRP at all.  
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The LRE is the heart of the PRP operation, duplicating frames when sending the frame 
and discarding the duplicate when receiving the frames. Figure 22 shows the PRP node 
structure and the operation of LRE. Note: The LRE is called DuoDriver in ABB 
devices using PRP. 
 
Figure 22. PRP node structure and operation of LRE. (Kirrmann et al. 2007). 
When sending a frame, the LRE of the sending node duplicates the frame and sends it 
through both ports at the same time. These two frames travel through both LANs and 
arrive to the receiving node with different delays. The LRE of the receiving node 
forwards the first received frame to the upper layers and discards the duplicate frame 
that comes later. If a network interface or a network path experiences a failure, data 
keeps flowing over the other network. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 11–12; Kirrmann et al. 
2007). Only a failure that makes both LANs inoperable will bring the redundancy down 
and makes the network unworkable.  
The LRE manages the redundancy by inserting a special Redundancy Control Trailer 
(RCT) to the Ethernet frames it sends to identify duplicates. Furthermore, it periodically 
sends PRP supervision frames and evaluates them from other DANPs in the network. 
(IEC 62439-3 2010: 12). RCT and network supervision are discussed further in 
Chapters 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. 
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5.2.3 Duplicate handling 
There are two methods which the LRE can use to handle duplicates in PRP nodes (IEC 
62439-3 2010: 14): 
 Duplicate accept, where the sending LRE uses the original frames (without 
Redundancy Control Trailer) and the receiving LRE forwards both arriving 
frames to upper layers. 
 Duplicate discard, where the sending LRE inserts a Redundancy Control 
Trailer to both frames and receiving LRE forwards the first frame to upper 
layers and filters out the duplicate. This method is preferred and default. 
In the duplicate accept method, the LRE does not try to discard the duplicate at all. The 
receiving node‟s LRE forwards both frames to upper layers and assumes that the 
applications as well as network protocols can withstand duplicates. This has however a 
drawback; increasing the processor load. The processor is interrupted twice as often as 
well as the communication stack is executed twice on frame reception. Furthermore, this 
method does not provide effortless redundancy supervision, because the correct 
reception of both frames is not monitored. TCP is designed to reject possible duplicates, 
so in practice it will discard the duplicate MMS frame in IEC 61850. The duplicate 
accept method can be used in application that cannot cope with the duplicate discard 
method´s extended frame structure, or for testing usage. Otherwise, the duplicate 
discard method should be used. 
In the duplicate discard method, the LRE does its best to discard the duplicate frame (it 
is however not necessary to discard every single duplicate). This method is advantageous 
compared to duplicate accept method, since it reduces the processor load and improves 
error detection coverage and network supervision. The Redundancy Control Trailer is 
inserted to both frames, and the duplicate discarding in the receiving node is based on the 
data inside RCT. Identifying duplicates without a special frame header could be 
implemented as well (e.g. storing and comparing frames), but these solutions are quite 
hungry for processor time and memory. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 14; Kirrmann et al. 2007; 
Weibel 2008: 5). 
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5.2.4 Duplicate identification with Redundancy Control Trailer 
The PRP duplicate identification is based on the contents of the Redundancy Control 
Trailer field, which is appended to duplicated frames by the sending node‟s LRE. The 
receiving node‟s LRE thus detects the duplicate frame about this information and 
discards the frame. 
The Redundancy Control Trailer consists of the following parameters (IEC 62439-3 
2010: 15): 
 16-bit sequence number (SequenceNr) 
 4-bit LAN identifier (Lan) 
 12-bit frame size (LSDU_size) 
The first part of the RCT is the sequence number. This number is the same in the 
duplicated frames and is the most important parameter in detecting the duplicate. The 
sequence number is increased every time when LRE sends a frame to certain 
destination. This way the receiving LRE can recognize the duplicate, as the both frames 
carry the same sequence number. Because the size of the sequence number is fixed (16 
bits), it will wrap to 0 after number of 65535 (Kirrmann 2011: 19). 
The second part of the RCT is LAN identifier field. It shows the LAN from which the 
frame was sent on; LAN A (value 1010) or LAN B (value 1011). This field is used for 
checking that LANs are correctly installed and connected. This LAN identifier field is 
the only difference between the duplicated frame pair. 
The third part of RCT is the size field. It tells the size of the LSDU (Link Service Data 
Unit), which is the payload of the frame that carries the real data itself. This field allows 
the receiving LRE easily identify frames that come from DANPs over frames that are 
sent by non-redundant ones (SANs). If the receiver detects that this field corresponds to 
the LSDU size and the LAN identifier matches to the LAN it is attached to, the frame is 
a candidate for discarding. It is preferable for the receiver is to scan the frames starting 
from the end. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 15; Kirrmann et al. 2007). 
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Figure 23 presents the structure of the Ethernet frame including the PRP Redundancy 
Control Trailer.  
 
Figure 23. Ethernet frame structure with PRP RCT. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 15). 
Ethernet standard specifies a restriction for minimum frame size that can be sent. The 
frames that are too short to meet this minimum frame size (64 octets) need padding. The 
sender builds the padding itself and inserts the RCT after it (IEC 62439-3 2010: 16). 
Figure 24 shows the PRP frame with padding and RCT. 
 
Figure 24. Ethernet frame with padding and PRP RCT. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 16). 
The RCT is inserted to the end of the frame. This has the effect that RCT field remains 
transparent to the application, allowing SANs to understand PRP frames because singly 
attached nodes do not take into account the octets between the payload (LSDU) and the 
Frame Check Sequence (FCS); they treat it as padding. (Kirrmann 2011: 16; Kirrmann 
et al. 2007). 
It has to be noted that receiving frame with RCT alone is not sufficient for identifying 
the source as PRP node (DANP). This is because certain protocols reply with the same 
frame they received. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 23). 
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5.2.5 Network management and supervision 
The management of PRP network can be done as in the case of any normal LAN. The 
switches in the LANs are considered as singly attached nodes with one IP address, 
while the doubly attached end nodes have one MAC and IP address too. The device 
(e.g. workstation computer) managing the network should be DANP or a SAN attached 
through RedBox to easily access both networks. 
To consider supervision of PRP network, Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) can be used. The state of redundancy can also be included in IEC 61850 
objects in an IED. (Kirrmann et al. 2007, Kirrmann et al. 2008). 
PRP nodes maintain a special „node table‟, which they use for PRP communication and 
network management purposes. This table keeps a record of all other nodes that the 
node can see in the network. For every node it communicates with, the table records 
MAC address, node type (SAN or DANP), number of frames received, error counters 
(e.g. frames received over wrong LAN), last time the node was seen and the current 
sequence number that the node will use for frame sending, among others. It can be seen 
that the nodes in the PRP network have another slight “communication protocol” over 
the link layer as they use node tables for PRP communication. With the help of node 
tables, the nodes can monitor that the frames come in sequence and come correctly over 
both LANs as well as keep track of errors. If a node leaves the network, it will be erased 
from the node table after a time parameter NodeForgetTime, which is 60 seconds by 
default. When a node sends or receives a frame, the node table is read an updated. For 
example, if a certain destination (MAC address) of a frame is a SAN, this is seen in the 
node table, and the frame is sent only on the corresponding port with no RCT. The node 
table runs on background and needs no interaction from the user, but can be seen and 
exposed as for diagnostic purposes. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 18–19, 12, 27). 
This „node table‟ is however not mandatory. The PRP parameters (e.g. port status and 
error counters can be monitored via IEC 61850 objects, where they belong to a special 
dataset. A DANP without node table sends all frames appended with RCT over both 
ports. (IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 21). 
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For supervision to work, each DANP‟s LRE periodically sends supervision messages 
and receives them from the other DANPs in the network. This allows checking the state 
of the networks and the connection of end nodes. The supervision frame confirms that 
the sender device is a DANP. It also tells the MAC addresses the device uses, and the 
PRP mode of the DANP (duplicate discard or duplicate accept). This information is 
updated to receiving node‟s node table.  
The supervision frame is sent as multicast on every LifeCheckInterval, which is a 
changeable parameter with default value of 2000 ms. A special address is reserved for 
the multicast sending. Figure 25 shows the structure of the PRP supervision frame. (IEC 
62439-3 2010: 12, 19, 25, 27). Because the supervision frame is not needed for any kind 
of network switchover, the 2 seconds sending interval is sufficient. 
 
Figure 25. Structure of the PRP supervision frame (with VLAN tag). (Weibel 2008: 
10). 
Table 6 presents the meanings of the parameters. 
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Table 6. Parameters of the PRP supervision frame (Weibel 2008: 11). 
 
If a node does not receive PRP supervision frames form a source, but receives frames 
from that source over one LAN, the node identifies the source as SAN A or SAN B 
depending on the LAN it receives frames from. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 23, 27).
 
During the PRP test network build-up (see Chapter 6.2), it was noticed that the ABB 
IEDs used IEC 61850 objects to supervise redundancy (the state of ports). The LAN 
state and error counters can be supervised from the IED (REF542plus).  
To form a sufficient supervision of networks, PRP nodes can use the IEC 61850 objects 
for supervision of ports, while SNMP can be used for supervision of Ethernet switches 
(also RedBoxes). Combining these two supervision methods will bring a good solution 
for network supervision. The IEC 62439-3 (2010: 28) states that SNMP can be also 
used for IED port supervision, which has the effect that one tool can supervise the 
whole network. 
 
 66 
5.2.6 Rules for configuration 
The standard IEC 62439-3 (2010: 19–20) presents some configuration guidelines that 
should be considered during installation and configuration: 
 Network must consist of two fail-independent LANs with similar properties, 
such that one LAN is able to carry all traffic in the occurrence of redundancy. 
 Labelling cables and Ethernet switches should be done to easily identify to 
which LAN a switch or cable belongs. One may use e.g. different colours. 
 All DANPs in the network must have the same multicast address for PRP 
supervision frames as well as the same LifeCheckInterval parameter (time 
interval for sending supervision frame). 
 Both adapters of every DANP shall have the same MAC address. The IP address 
of every device in the whole network (LAN A and LAN B) must be unique. 
Because the redundancy is transparent to upper layers, A DANP has always a 
same IP address whether seen by LAN A or LAN B. 
 SANs that need to communicate with each other must be attached to one LAN, 
or to both LANs through RedBox. 
A DANP can however support MAC address substitution, and in that case the MAC 
addresses can differ. If so, the MAC address of the DANP shall be the address of 
adapter A, while adapter B can use different MAC address. Address substitution is not 
specified further in the IEC 62439-3. 
Also the connectors of the devices have a rule for labeling. When connectors are 
situated vertically, the upper one is identified as LAN A and the lower one as LAN B in 
the normal position. If the connectors are situated horizontally, the left connector is 
identified as LAN A and the right connector as LAN B (seen from the side where cables 
are plugged). 
There are also additional recommendations in the reference ABB Oy (2011b: 76). For 
time synchronization, two independent GPS should be used, one for each LAN. Also 
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both networks should preferably use the same network architecture. As mentioned 
before, the two LANs must never be interconnected. 
PRP is compatible with RSTP and with MRP (IEC 62439-2), so they can be further 
used inside LANs if seen necessary (Kirrmann et al. 2007). To assure fail-independent 
operation, the redundant LANs should not be powered from the same power source 
(Weibel 2008: 3). 
5.2.7 PRP summary 
The usage of Parallel Redundancy Protocol has many properties and characteristics that 
are demanded by IEC 61850. First of all, it achieves seamless recovery time, which 
makes it suitable for time-critical applications (especially IEC 61850 process bus). It 
tolerates any component failure that can happen in a network while remaining 
transparent to the application, which brings simplicity for engineering. The LANs can 
use any topology while allowing the use of singly attached end nodes (though in one 
LAN only). In addition to IEC 61850, it can be used also with other protocols of 
Industrial Ethernet.  
PRP has however a disadvantage of increasing the costs because of the duplication of 
the network components. The end nodes also need a second Ethernet controller and a 
special layer to handle duplicate frames. Still, the Parallel Redundancy Protocol fulfills 
all requirements of IEC 61850 based substation automation and is thus worth the 
investment, especially for time-critical traffic‟s point of view. (Kirrmann et al 2007; 
Kirrmann et al. 2008).  
Figure 26 below presents an example of the usage of PRP in the station bus substation 
network. The station bus is thus doubled. As seen in the figure, RedBoxes can be used 
to attach devices with only one port to both networks.  
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Figure 26. Duplicated station bus with PRP. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 11). 
5.3 High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) 
The High-availability Seamless Redundancy handles redundancy in the end nodes as 
well. A HSR node has two ports operated in parallel, as in the case of PRP, but here the 
node is called DANH (Doubly Attached Node implementing HSR). HSR can be seen 
as an implementation of PRP in a particular topology of ring and rings of rings. This is 
why most of the properties of PRP thus apply for HSR.  
HSR allows reducing hardware costs because Ethernet switches are not needed in HSR 
network. Every node in the ring must however be a switching node, having two ports 
and a hardware integrated switch element, as the IEDs in the ring of IEDs topology (see 
Chapter 3.3.4). Here, the nodes implement HSR protocol. (ABB Oy 2010a: 60).  
5.3.1 Operation principle 
Like PRP, HSR uses frame duplication and sending them over different paths. The 
sending node sends two copies of the same frame through both its ports at the same time 
in to the ring. Here, the frames travel into opposite directions in the ring. Each node in 
 69 
the ring forwards the frames except the node that sent that frame, and the node being an 
unique destination for the frame. Because of the sending node discards the frames it has 
already sent, the frames do not keep circulating in the ring. Figure 27 shows an example 
of HSR network. 
 
Figure 27. An example of HSR network in ring topology. A source multicasts the 
frame to every ring participant. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 32). 
A destination node receives thus two identical frames, within a certain interval. The first 
frame is passed to upper layer and the later coming duplicate is discarded. This 
operation reminds very much that of PRP. To detect duplicates, the frames carry a HSR 
tag, which is discussed in Chapter 5.3.3. 
Unlike in PRP, singly attached nodes cannot be connected straight to the ring, because 
they have only one port and do not deal with the HSR tag. Therefore, a RedBox is 
needed, acting as a proxy for the SANs behind it. When using HSR, Ethernet switches 
are not needed in the ring. A RedBox can also include a switch element for connecting 
SANs to network. 
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Because the frames are duplicated and sent to opposite directions, one frame gets 
through to the destination if a failure occurs and breaks the ring. However, because the 
source node duplicates the frames, the traffic of the ring is roughly doubled. This should 
be taken in to account if there are many traffic hungry HSR nodes in the network ring. 
(IEC 62439-3 2010: 31–32, 34; Kirrmann, Weber, Kleineberg & Weibel 2009). 
5.3.2 Node structure 
The node structure of a DANH is very similar to the one of DANP (PRP). A DANH has 
also two Ethernet ports with same MAC and IP addresses and form a single interface to 
the application, which is thus not aware of HSR. HSR is also layer 2 redundancy 
protocol and allows other link layer protocols like ARP to operate normally, simplifying 
engineering. 
Figure 28 shows the HSR node structure and operation. The Link Redundancy Entity is 
also present in HSR node, handling both Ethernet ports and duplicates and presenting a 
single interface to upper layers, alike in PRP. Because the HSR nodes must also forward 
the frames, a switching logic is included to the LRE to enable this. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 
33; Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 28. HSR node structure and operation. (Kirrmann 2010: 13). 
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In the figure, a source node multicasts a frame. The LRE duplicates the frame and sends 
it over both ports at the same time (1 and 2). The switching logic in the nodes forward 
the frames from one port to another (3 and 4), but not the own frames the node has sent 
(5 and 6). In the destination node, the LRE receives both frames (in fault-free 
operation), consumes the first one and discards the duplicate frame (7). The directions 
in the figure are clockwise (CW) and counterclockwise (CCW). (Kirrmann 2010: 13). 
Alike in PRP, the LRE in the HSR node inserts a special identification called HSR tag 
to the frame it sends for duplicate identifying. It also sends HSR supervision frames and 
evaluates them from other HSR nodes in the network. (Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
The LRE can forward a frame before receiving it entirely. This is called cut-through 
mode and it allows reducing the forwarding delay, especially with long frames. 
5.3.3 Duplicate frame identification 
For duplicate detection, the LRE uses a special six-octet HSR tag inserted to frames 
right before sending them. On the contrary to RCT in PRP frames, the HSR tag is 
inserted before the payload of the frame. This allows the cut-through operation 
introduced above, allowing quicker forwarding of a HSR frame. 
The HSR tag consists of four parameters altogether (IEC 62439-3 2010: 48): 
 16-bit Ethertype field 
 4-bit path identifier 
 12-bit frame size (LSDU_size) 
 16-bit sequence number (SequenceNr) 
The first part of the HSR tag is the Ethertype field, which identifies a HSR frame. The 
path field is used to identify different HSR frames (e.g. supervision frames from regular 
HSR frames). The LSDU size field is defined in the same way as in PRP, informing the 
size of the HSR tag and the payload of the frame. This field is however not used for 
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identifying a HSR frame (as it was in the case of PRP) because the Ethertype field does 
this task. It is however kept as a help for hardware implementation. 
A node maintains a sequence number for each destination (MAC address). The 
sequence number is increased every time when the sending node sends a frame. The 
LRE detects the duplicate uniquely from source address and sequence number. 
(Kirrmann et al. 2009; Kirrmann 2010: 8).  
Figure 29 below shows the structure of a HSR tagged frame. 
 
Figure 29. HSR tagged frame. (Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
The HSR tag inserted before the payload (LSDU) has the effect that SANs cannot 
directly understand HSR frames, but it enables the node to forward such frame right 
after receiving the HSR tag. The forwarding can start after 5 µs at 100 Mbit/s. Thus in a 
HSR ring of 50 nodes, an end-to-end delay is averagely 125 µs. (Kirrmann et al. 2010). 
5.3.4 Network supervision and management 
To supervise the network, each DANH‟s LRE sends HSR supervision frames, similarly 
in PRP. The HSR supervision frame is sent over both ports on every LifeCheckInterval 
(2 seconds by default). This time does not need to be shorter, because it is not needed 
for any switchover, but to check redundancy. The HSR properties (e.g. port status) can 
be supervised as in PRP (SNMP, IEC 61850 objects). 
All in all, HSR network supervision and management works as in the case of PRP. The 
network management computer can be attached through RedBox. (Kirrmann 2010: 37–
38, 40). 
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5.3.5 Ring coupling 
A HSR ring can be coupled to other HSR ring(s). For this, a device called QuadBox is 
needed. A QuadBox has quadruple ports with ability to forward frames as any other 
DANH. It passes the frames to the other ring unchanged, but is also able to filter those 
frames that are not intended to be forwarded to the other ring. For ring coupling, one 
QuadBox could be sufficient for correct operation of the rings in fault-free state, but two 
QuadBoxes are needed to defeat a single point of failure. Figure 30 presents an example 
of ring coupling. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 35). 
 
Figure 30. HRS ring coupling example. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 36). 
The above figure shows a situation where a frame is sent to a destination that is present 
in the other ring. Because the ring has two QuadBoxes, the duplicate frames are 
duplicated as they are transferred to the second ring. However, this does not cause four 
frames circulating in the second ring, since the second QuadBox will not forward the 
frame from the other QuadBox, if it has already forwarded the one it received from the 
other ring. Also, it will not forward the frame coming from other ring if it has already 
forwarded the duplicate frame sent from the other QuadBox. This operation prevents 
duplication of the duplicates. 
 74 
The QuadBox can be constructed of two RedBoxes. This has the effect that if one 
RedBox fails, the other ring remains fully redundant. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 35). 
HSR rings can be formed hierarchically keeping the substation network in mind, e.g. 
station level devices have their own ring and every bay, substation building or voltage 
level have their own ring for IEDs. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 36–37; Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
5.3.6 HSR summary 
High-availability Seamless Redundancy is a protocol reusing many principles of the 
Parallel Redundancy Protocol. It also has many properties fulfilling the demanding 
requirements of IEC 61850, e.g. the seamless recovery time, making it suitable for time-
critical processes. It also tolerates any single component failure and is transparent to the 
application, which brings simplicity for engineering. HSR can be used also with other 
protocols of Industrial Ethernet in addition to IEC 61850. The costs are reduced because 
of the embedded switches in IEDs; no Ethernet switches are needed in HSR ring. It is 
compatible with PRP and complements it. 
However, HSR has also a disadvantage of reducing available bandwidth in a ring, 
especially for multicast messages. It also needs hardware implementation (switching 
logic for frame forwarding). Furthermore, devices with one port have to be attached 
through RedBox, because the HSR ring does not allow non-HSR traffic in principle. 
(Kirrmann 2010: 39, 43; Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
Figure 31 shows an example of the usage of HSR in the station bus. The IEDs are 
formed in rings depending on the voltage level and the ring coupling is done using 
QuadBoxes. 
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Figure 31. Station bus with HSR rings of rings. (ABB Oy 2010a: 61). 
5.4 IEC 62439-3 Amendment 1 
At the moment, there are pending modifications to the IEC 62439-3 standard. An 
amendment to the standard IEC 62439-3 is about to be published. Since the protocols 
specified in this part of the standard were adopted by IEC 61850, changes became 
necessary, such as clarifications of specifications (also slackening for them to allow 
various implementations), simplifying implementations and consideration for time 
synchronization with IEEE 1588. These changes are already being implemented in 
development projects, and the amendment specifies them to secure interoperability. 
(IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 6). 
The amendment also presents new version of PRP called PRP-1 while the present one is 
called PRP-0. The main advantage in PRP-1 is the fact that it allows better support for 
the PRP and HSR network coupling. However, the PRP-1 differs from the original PRP 
in the area of Redundancy Control Trailer. In addition to fields that were found in the 
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PRP-0, PRP-1 adds a 16 bit suffix after the LSDU size field, as seen in the Figure 32. 
The size of RCT is thus grown to 6 octets. The PRP-1 suffix is not calculated to the 
LSDU size field. (IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 13–14). 
 
Figure 32. PRP-1 frame with RCT. (IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 13). 
The sequence number handling differs also from PRP-0. While PRP-0 increases the 
sequence number for each frame sent to a certain destination, PRP-1 increases the 
sequence number for each frame sent, not taken the destination into account. This 
allows connecting PRP and HSR networks with redundant connection points. 
The PRP-1 suffix identifies the usage of PRP-1 frames, along with the frame size. A 
network is however assumed to be configured homogeneously to include nodes either as 
PRP-0 or as PRP-1. Supervision frames can be used to check correct configuration, 
since they carry the info of the PRP version. (IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 14, 18). 
Because of the pending amendment, most manufacturers have not yet released HSR 
products at all since they are waiting the latest IEC 62439-3 paper. The draft for the 
amendment can be expected to obtain the status of International Standard not earlier 
than in the end of 2011. For example, RuggedCom HSR products (RedBox) are planned 
to be released in the first or second quarter of 2012. This is also true for PRP RedBox. 
(Grendar 2011). 
The first ABB IEDs with HSR implementation can be expected to be released on the 
market in 2012. 
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5.5 Common properties for seamless redundancy protocols 
The standard IEC 62439-3 (2010: 13, 27, 51) presents that every doubly attached node 
(with switching logic) can be configured to use any of the following redundancy 
protocols: Reduced RSTP (no designated port role), RSTP, MRP, PRP or HSR. This 
allows devices e.g. IEDs to support new seamless redundancy protocols but also single 
LAN redundancy protocols. This provides that the same IED can be used for any level 
and topology for redundancy, and is thus very flexible to use and configure in different 
applications. The IEC 62439 presents a special MAC address substitution mode, where 
the two ports of a node can have different MAC addresses, which allows the connection 
of the ports to a single LAN. 
For the upcoming ABB IEDs, the integrated switch module‟s mode of redundancy can 
be chosen between PRP and HSR. It provides a third port for debugging/maintenance, 
but this port can be also used to attach a SAN to redundant network. The IED can thus 
act as a simplified RedBox. (Suomi 2011). 
The PRP can be implemented in software, but HSR should be preferably implemented 
in hardware because of the frame forwarding tasks (switching logic). What comes to the 
time synchronization, both the protocols already support the high precise time 
synchronization protocol IEEE 1588 PTP. (ABB Oy 2010a: 61; Kirrmann et al. 2009). 
5.5.1 Redundancy box (RedBox) 
Generally, the RedBox is needed for connecting singly attached nodes to redundant PRP 
and HSR networks. It has at least three ports; two of them connected to the redundant 
networks and one to an interlink (connection to the SAN). One or more SANs can be 
attached to RedBox, which acts as a proxy for them, making the transition from the 
single LAN to double LAN and vice versa. The SANs behind RedBox appear as Virtual 
Doubly Attached Nodes (VDAN), and the RedBoxes send supervision frames to the 
redundant networks on behalf of the SANs, appending also its own information to the 
frame (see Chapter 5.2.5). (IEC 62439-3 2010: 13). 
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A RedBox has a LRE as any other DANP or DANH. It has also an own IP address for 
management and possible local applications. The IEC 62439-3 (2010: 13; 44) divides 
the RedBoxes to PRP RedBox and to HSR RedBox, which has many operation modes. 
The standard does not tell if one physical RedBox can be configured to PRP or HSR 
mode, or if they must be totally different devices.  
Figure 33 shows the structure of a HSR RedBox, where the LRE includes also the 
switching logic as any DANH. A RedBox can also include a switch, and in that case, 
the interlink is an inside connection as seen in the Figure 33 below. 
 
Figure 33. Structure of a RedBox (Redundancy box) for HSR network. (IEC 62439-3 
2010: 40). 
A RedBox maintains a nodes table as any other node. In addition, it keeps a proxy node 
table, which contains the entries behind it (MAC addresses of the SANs). (IEC 62439-3 
2010: 48).  
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A HSR RedBox can be configured to three modes, which differ in the area of interlink 
traffic (IEC 62439-3 2010: 44):  
 HSR-SAN, where the interlink carries untagged frames. This mode is used for 
connecting a SAN to HSR network. 
 HSR-PRP, where interlink carries PRP tagged (A or B) frames. This mode is 
used for connecting different PRP and HSR networks. See Chapter 5.4.3. 
 HSR-HSR, where interlink carries HSR tagged frames. This mode is used for 
HSR ring coupling, where the RedBox operates as a half of QuadBox. See 
Chapter 5.3.5. 
5.5.2 Connecting PRP and HSR networks 
Different HSR and PRP networks can be coupled together via two separate RedBoxes. 
The RedBoxes are configured to handle HSR traffic in the two ports, and PRP traffic on 
the interlink. The coupling can be done only with PRP-1 and HSR. 
As a frame transits from network to other, the sequence number of RCT of the PRP-1 
frame is reused for the HSR tag and vice versa. This supports the frame identification 
from a network to other and duplicate identification in the HSR ring as the two 
RedBoxes inject the same frame to the ring. Figure 34 presents an example of 
connecting HSR and PRP rings together. In the Figure, a PRP source sends a frame to 
destination node in the HSR ring. (IEC 62439-3 2010/Amd1: 37). 
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Figure 34. Connecting PRP and HSR networks. (IEC 62439-3 2010: 38). 
The two RedBoxes are configured as RedBox A or RedBox B as the figure above shows 
to accept PRP frames on the interlink, and to tag the correct LAN identification if the 
sender is in the ring. The two RedBoxes would duplicate the frames as the frame is 
injected to the ring (frames BA and AB), but does not if the RedBox receives the frame 
before sending it itself. For example, if the RedBox A receives the AB frame before 
sending the A frame, it will not send it. On the contrary, if the RedBox B does not 
receive the frame A from Redbox A, it will generate the frame AB. Multicast frames are 
removed from the ring by the RedBox that forwarded them to the ring.  
It can be seen that the RedBoxes convert the PRP frames to HSR frames and vice versa, 
keeping the frame duplicates still identified with the help of the reused sequence 
 81 
number. Thus, the different HSR and PRP networks can be coupled together. (IEC 
62439-3 2010: 38–39). 
5.6 Comparison of the redundancy protocols PRP, HSR, RSTP and MRP 
The seamless redundancy protocols standardized in IEC 62439-3 fulfill the high 
availability requirements of a modern IEC 61850 based substation. Along with RSTP, 
they can be used as redundancy protocol on their own or they all can be combined in a 
substation communication network. Table 7 below presents a comparison of these 
redundancy protocols and their performance. The Media Redundancy Protocol (a 
competitor of RSTP in ring topology) is also included to comparison for interest. 
Table 7. Comparison of redundancy protocols for substation automation: PRP, HSR, 
MRP and RSTP. (IEC 61439-1: 23; DesRuisseaux 2009; Dreher 2011, 
Kirrmann 2010; Kirrmann 2011).  
 
As seen from the above table, the protocols are needed for different purposes. Only PRP 
and HSR can provide seamless recovery with no frame loss during failure, because they 
handle the redundancy in the doubly attached end nodes. They are a good choice for 
applications that cannot tolerate any network recovery delay. For a single ring topology, 
the present and most used redundancy protocol RSTP has a new competitor MRP, 
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which can provide better recovery times that are nearly independent of the amount of 
switches in the ring topology. Especially, the 10/30 ms recovery time is a good reason 
to choose MRP over RSTP. MRP standard is however owned by Hirschmann and 
Siemens (Hiper-ring) and has a license fee, which may cause that other Ethernet switch 
manufacturers do not want to implement it to their own products. (Dreher 2011; 
Grendar 2011). Furthermore, IEC 61850 mentions only PRP-1, HSR and RSTP for link 
layer redundancy of station and process bus. 
It is worth mentioning that HSR and PRP can tolerate any network component (e.g. 
cable and Ethernet switch) failure because the message is sent over two different paths. 
An appropriate question would be when to use a specific protocol and whether the gain 
in system availability is worth the costs invested in a high-availability redundancy 
protocol.  
Hoga (2010a, 2010b) states that if a substation automation network carries only client-
server communication (TCP/IP traffic with MMS), the RSTP and MRP are totally 
sufficient redundancy protocols to use. TCP/IP traffic is not considered time critical and 
it has a mechanism that will repeat the lost frames. When the GOOSE messages 
(interlocking, trip) are used, the system gets more critical. However, because of the 
retransmission mode of GOOSE, the time critical message does not necessarily get lost 
during network recovery. Furthermore, Hoga (2010a) calculated a probability for a 
situation where network is down during a time critical situation (e.g. GOOSE message). 
It states that if a network recovers once a year, the recovery time is 100 ms and the time 
critical event happens 50 times a year, the probability for such situation is 1:6.3 million 
per year, and is thus very minimal.  
PRP and HSR provide an additional level to redundancy, which can be used at the same 
level as RSTP and MRP, but are especially required in the applications regarding to IEC 
61850-9-2 Process bus (see Chapter 2.2.5). The seamless recovery is a requirement in 
the process bus because of the Sampled Values. Sampled Values is time-critical traffic 
like GOOSE messages, but does not have retransmission scheme; it is continuous 
stream of samples (see Chapter 2.2.3). During network reconfiguration, an IED 
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experiences a measuring blackout, which affects negatively to the protection. This is 
why seamless redundancy protocols are needed in the process bus. Also busbar 
protection requires seamless recover time (see Table 5 on page 53). (Hoga 2010b). 
The network designer should determine which level of redundancy is needed for the 
substation network required by the application. The minimum level is RSTP, which is 
easily and effectively introduced in ring configuration. One must however verify the 
effect of different transmission speeds and port types on recovery time of RSTP 
network (see Chapter 4.1.2). PRP and HSR are to be used in the process bus 
applications, but are also reasonable to use in station bus if it carries much time critical 
traffic, or if an Ethernet switch failure must be tolerated. The comparison of IEC 62439 
redundancy protocols is shown in Appendix 1 as a whole. 
Figure 35 below shows an informative example how the IEC 61850 referenced 
redundancy protocols can be used and combined in a substation automation system. The 
station bus uses PRP combined with RSTP in both LANs. The bays use HSR or PRP 
depending on the case. As seen, the usage of the redundancy protocols can be very 
flexible. 
 
Figure 35. Mixing the IEC 61850 redundancy protocols. (Kirrmann 2010: 26).  
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6 TESTING PARALLEL REDUNDANCY PROTOCOL 
At the moment, the current version of PRP is supported in the following ABB devices 
available on the market: Protection relay REF542plus, Station gateway COM600 as 
well as Relion® 670 series IEDs. Still, neither there are devices at the moment that 
support HSR on the market nor there are RedBoxes. These are however expected to be 
released in the very near future, as the amendment to the standard IEC 62439-3 gets 
official. 
The two ports in COM600 can be used either in PRP mode or, in the case of only one 
network, with Intel teaming mode Switch Fault Tolerance, where the two ports are 
connected to two different switches to tolerate switch failure. The two ports of 
REF542plus, however, only allow PRP mode. The mechanism that handles the two-port 
redundancy and duplicates according to IEC 62439-3 is called DuoDriver in ABB 
devices. It plays the role of Link Redundancy Entity -layer (LRE) described in Chapter 
5.2.2 and in addition to IEDs, it can be installed to any computer with suitable network 
interface card (NIC). 
At the very beginning of writing this thesis, it was decided to test the Parallel 
Redundancy Protocol with ABB devices and MicroSCADA. The test was made to 
confirm 
 if the operation is accordant with the IEC 62439 standard,  
 if the commitments of the standard apply in real world and  
 what must be taken into account when building and configuring a substation 
automation system with MicroSCADA and IEDs using Parallel Redundancy 
Protocol.  
The test setup that was built and the test procedure of the PRP system along with a brief 
description of MicroSCADA are presented in the following parts of this chapter.  
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6.1 Test procedure preparation 
The setup for testing PRP consisted of two separate MicroSCADA computers, two 
doubly attached REF 542plus protection relays and two singly attached Relion® 630 
series protection relays (REF630 and REM630) along with two Ethernet switches and 
one analyzer computer. The two computers were configured to Hot Stand-By (HSB) 
mode to make the MicroSCADA redundant as well, which is a common solution in 
substation automation systems. Figure 36 below shows the lay-out of the test setup. 
 
Figure 36. Lay-out of the setup for the PRP test. LAN A is shown with red and LAN B 
with green colour. 
In a HSB system, the MicroSCADA applications are made redundant i.e. there is 
always a pair of applications connected in Hot Stand-By mode. One application is 
active (hot) receiving and processing the data from the process, also managing the 
process displays. While being hot, the application shadows all data (e.g. process, 
configuration) to the stand-by application situated in the other computer. This way the 
stand-by application is always in the same state as the hot application and ready to take 
over the process communication if the computer with the hot application fails. If so, the 
switchover happens rapidly and the state of stand-by application changes to hot, thus 
allowing the process to be supervised and controllable in the event of computer failure. 
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The MicroSCADA computers with HSB mode can be seen as a redundant end node in 
the network. (ABB Oy 2010d: 29–30). 
6.1.1 MicroSCADA 
MicroSCADA is a supervision software, which allows real-time monitoring and control 
of primary and secondary equipment of the transmission and distribution substations. It 
is designed mainly for substation automation and network control applications, but the 
application area covers also non-electrical applications like district heating, oil and gas 
distribution etc. At the writing moment of this thesis, the latest version of MicroSCADA 
is SYS 600 9.3 Feature Pack 1. The main components of a MicroSCADA system 
hardware are system servers, communication servers, workstations, peripheral 
equipment (printers, GPS clocks etc.), communication equipment (switches, routers, 
modems) together with IEDs, RTUs and other process devices (ABB Oy 2010d: 13). 
MicroSCADA supports a variety of communication protocols including IEC 60870-5-
101, -103 -104, DNP, Modbus, LON, SPA and IEC 61850 among others. To 
communicate with the process, a communication link is formed between the system 
server SYS 600 and process devices, e.g. IEDs and RTUs. Each protocol comes with its 
own individual characteristics as well as own physical media and interfaces, which has 
to be taken into account when using such protocol. A communication unit forms a 
software interface in SYS 600, which is protocol dependent. The most common 
communication units are PC-NET, which is used with most legacy protocols and IEC 
61850 OPC Server/External OPC DA Client, which is used with IEC 61850. Usually 
SYS600, IEC 61850 OPC Server and OPC DA Client are all located in the same 
computer. The components of an IEC 61850 based system with MicroSCADA are 
shown in the Appendix 2. 
The OPC (OLE for Process Control)  is a de-facto standard which allows connecting 
various systems and devices to the automation system. It is increasingly used within the 
area of power industry. It defines the data exchange between servers and clients. SYS 
600 allows full OPC connectivity and can act both as a server and a client. (ABB Oy 
2010d: 18, 31). 
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The objects of the MicroSCADA system can be divided to system objects, which are 
used to configure and manage the components of the system, and to application 
objects, which define the application behavior.  
Each and every station (e.g. IED), printer, system node (e.g. base system, PC-NET) and 
application has a system object, which has many attributes used for monitoring and 
configure the system. The most important system object types are System, Application, 
Link, Node, Station, Printer and Monitor. (ABB Oy 2010d: 16). 
The applications in MicroSCADA have certain tasks. For example, an application can 
supervise power distribution or heat distribution. Different applications can also 
communicate with each other. Application objects related to application perform 
various tasks and are programmable. The most important application objects are 
presented in the table below with a brief description. 
Table 8. MicroSCADA application objects. (ABB Oy 2010d: 17). 
 
A great role in the MicroSCADA is played by programming language SCIL 
(Supervisory Control Implementation Language). All system and application objects are 
created and managed by SCIL. Also every supervision and control task is executed by 
SCIL programs, usually hidden from the user. It can also be used to generate new 
applications and dialogs to the user interface. 
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The MicroSCADA system has two databases, where most of the application objects are 
stored. The databases are process database, which contains process objects, event 
handling objects and scales and report database, which contains data objects, 
command procedures, time channels and event channels. (ABB Oy 2010d: 17). 
6.1.2 Test equipment 
What comes to the test material, the following table presents the hardware and software 
needed for the test setup in detail. 
Table 9. Hardware (a) and software (b) used in the test procedure. 
(a)              (b) 
 
All the software listed in the table above (excluding engineering tools and ITT600) was 
installed in both test computers. The IEC 61850 OPC Server and External OPC DA 
Client are needed for IEC 61850 communication. The dual port Intel NICs are needed 
for DuoDriver (also quad port NICs can be used) because DuoDriver does not work 
with separate NICs. The Sverker 650 Relay Test Unit was used to generate a current 
measurement for the two REF542plus protection relays to create MMS traffic in both 
LANs. Finally, a separate analyzer computer was used to analyze traffic in the 
network(s) with both network analyzer programs and via switch port mirroring. Table 
10 shows the IP addresses of the devices used in the network and node types according 
to Parallel Redundancy Protocol. 
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Table 10. IP addresses and node types of the devices in the test network. 
 
The two NICs of the analyzer computer were used independently to capture traffic from 
both network switches at the same time by using two instances of the analyzer program 
in certain tests. The analyzer computer‟s integrated Ethernet NIC was used together 
with D-Link USB Ethernet adapter for this purpose. 
6.1.3 PRP properties of the MicroSCADA computer 
The PRP functionality can be implemented to MicroSCADA computer with a 
compatible NIC by installing the DuoDriver software driver. This driver manages the 
two ports of the NIC and allows them operate according to the PRP specification, acting 
as the LRE layer (see Chapter 5.2.2). The installation package is included in 
MicroSCADA, and should be installed right after MicroSCADA installation.  
The DuoDriver offers a separate management and configuration GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) for supervision and management of PRP after the installation, shown in 
Figure 37. It has frame counters for both adapters, including error rate, frames sent, 
frames received etc. and shows also status information of the ports as well as MAC 
addresses of the ports and PRP supervision multicast address. The information that the 
frame counters provide is needed if a network is incorrectly configured (especially the 
counter „Duo frames received on wrong line‟) or if one will need deeper analysis of the 
traffic through the DuoDriver. These counters are useful for network debugging. 
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Figure 37. DuoDriver management interface. 
For management, duplicate accept mode can also be chosen if necessary and the sending 
time interval of the supervision frame can be adjusted (Life Check Interval). The „Drop 
Window Max‟ value is the maximum gap of sequence numbers related to duplicate 
discarding. Usually the default values are fairly usable for the configuration. The 
transparent reception enables PRP frame analyzing in the MicroSCADA computers, 
since it does not remove the RCT from the received frames when set on. The node 
tables of the current node can also be viewed from the GUI. 
The DuoDriver information of the local computer is available through the OPC Server, 
which obtains the values from the DuoDriver and needs no special configuration. The 
status information is available via OPC attributes (Attributes\DuoDriver\‟Instance 
name‟\‟LAN name‟\Working) and can be mapped to MicroSCADA process objects 
through the OPC DA Client. Also the „error rate‟ counter can be mapped if needed. The 
IEC 61850 OPC server updates the status information of the ports from the driver every 
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five seconds. Appendix 3 shows more details of DuoDriver status mapping and sending 
between HSB computers. 
6.1.4 PRP properties of protection IED REF542plus 
When planning to use PRP with REF542plus, it must be taken care of that the device is 
equipped with a dual port Ethernet board. In the REF542plus configuration tool, the 
topology of the ports must be set to Dual Channel in Ethernet Board parameters section 
to enable dual port operation.  
The DuoDriver of REF542plus is not configurable and provides less information than 
the one installed to computer. The DuoDriver information of the device is found as IEC 
61850 object under the logical node LPHD in the data object SrcSt (LD0.LPHD1.SrcSt 
in the test configuration), which is included in dataset StatIed. It provides two Boolean 
data attributes that describe the status of the DuoDriver (port status): stValA and 
stValB. It also manages error rate counters for both ports via attributes errRateA and 
errRateB, respectively. These attributes however provide enough information to 
supervise the DuoDriver state and to check if the network is configured correctly. The 
attributes and their values can be also viewed in the HMI of the IED itself. Other 
DuoDriver settings are default and not changeable, e.g. the duplicate discard mode is 
always used and the supervision frame sending interval is 2 seconds. 
The IED DuoDriver status is available through OPC and can be mapped to 
MicroSCADA application with little effort. The data object „SrcSt‟ must however be 
present in the IED configuration file. 
6.1.5 Test network configuration notes 
The installation of test setup began with installing the DuoDriver v. 2.4.27077 to both 
MicroSCADA computers after MicroSCADA setup. In the installation, the pairing of 
the network interface cards (NICs) was made. After the installation, it is good to make 
sure that the driver works properly. This can be easily made by continuously pinging a 
DANP while disconnecting one network at time. The driver and network behaves 
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correctly if the ping gets a continuous response. Ping itself is an ICMP (Internet Control 
Message Protocol) utility to test connection of a device on IP network. It sends an echo 
request to the target address and waits for reply, measuring also the time passed. 
When the network is considered to be ready, it should be checked from the management 
GUI that the error counters do not keep increasing. If they do, it is a sign of an error in 
network configuration e.g. attachment of a port to a wrong LAN. Also the REF542plus 
maintain error counters. Nevertheless, if a device is attached wrongly to the network, it 
will not stop communicating; it will only increase the error counters. All devices should 
be correctly connected to the network for reliable supervision and network consistency. 
Because MicroSCADA can recognize the installed DuoDriver, it is worthwhile to install 
the DuoDriver before starting to build application. 
MicroSCADA 9.3 Feature Pack 1 with Hotfix 2 was installed to both test computers. 
The test setup and application building is not documented further in this thesis, but 
engineering process with REF542plus and IEC 61850 can be found in the Appendix 2. 
When using HSB setup with IEC 61850, both the computers have the OPC Server and 
OPC DA Client installed and running as shown in Figure 38. The IEDs can send their 
events to both HSB computers, although the supervising application is hot in only one 
of them. The latest data of the IEDs is thus available for both the OPC Servers. 
 
Figure 38. Principle of redundant (HSB) MicroSCADA system topology with IEC 
61850. (ABB Oy 2010e: 47). 
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In the test setup, time synchronization was done so that SYS1 was configured as an 
SNTP time server and all other devices were set to sync to the time of the SYS1. 
Also a fictitious single line diagram was built together with system self supervision 
picture, which is shown in Figure 39. It shows the shadowing phase of the HSB, 
DuoDriver supervision of both computers and both REF542plus protection relays. 
Furthermore, the connection to every IED is supervised. 
 
Figure 39. System self supervision display. 
The guidelines for configuration of an IEC 61850 based MicroSCADA system using 
PRP can be found in the DuoDriver installation manual and from the case-specific 
MicroSCADA manuals as well as case-specific IED manuals. Also the standard IEC 
62439-3 and related articles can help understanding the PRP fundamentals more deeply. 
The overview of the whole test system setup is found in the Appendix 4. 
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6.2 Test measurements 
Altogether nine tests were made during the testing phase. The sections below handle 
them one by one. Port mirroring in both Ethernet switches was used to gather the traffic 
for the analyzer software. The analyzer computer was connected to one port, and the 
egress (outgoing) traffic of all other ports was mirrored to this port (as seen in Figure 35 
on page 85). Software that was used for network traffic capture and analysis included 
Wireshark (www.wireshark.com) and ITT600 (Integrated Testing Toolbox) by ABB. 
6.2.1 Structure of the RCT and PRP Supervision Frame 
The first test was meant to commonly clarify the structure of the Redundancy Control 
Trailer as well as the PRP Supervision Frame that are the basic elements of an IEC 
62439-3 based PRP network, discussed in Chapter 5.2. In this test, the analyzer 
computer was attached to Ethernet Switch 1 (LAN A) and the network traffic was 
captured for a time of a few seconds. Firstly, a captured frame with RCT was analyzed. 
Figure 40 shows the structure of an MMS frame with RCT in Wireshark. 
 
Figure 40. MMS frame with RCT in Wireshark. 
The analyzed frame is a MMS frame, sent from SYS1 to protection relay REF542plus 1 
(192.168.2.1 → 192.168.2.21). Because the sending and the receiving node are both 
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DANPs and use the duplicate discard mode, RCT is attached to the end of a frame. In 
the figure, this particular frame includes an MMS request for obtaining operation mode 
of the REF542plus 1. The RCT is appended after the payload (MMS in this case) of the 
frame including sequence number (19837), LAN identification (LAN A) and a size field 
(102). The RCT is thus accordant with the standard of PRP-0. 
Also PRP supervision frames were captured, one of which is shown in Figure 41 below. 
 
Figure 41. PRP Supervision frame in Wireshark. 
The PRP Supervision frame is also accordant with PRP-0 (see Chapter 5.2.5). It is sent 
to the reserved multicast address (Iec_00:01:00 equals 01:15:4e:00:01:00) by 
REF542plus 2 (identified from MAC address). This frame is sent to all DANPs. The 
PRP supervision frame includes information about its sender, e.g. duplicate handling 
mode and MAC address. Also the RCT is appended in the end of the frame as in the 
case of normal frames. 
6.2.2 Identical data flow in both networks 
According to the standard, the traffic of DANPs both in LAN A and in LAN B should 
be identical. To confirm this, a capture of the traffic in both networks was made 
simultaneously, lasting a few seconds. The SANs (REF630 and REM630) were 
disconnected from the network during this test as only the traffic of DANPs was 
examined. Figure 42 and Figure 43 present a screenshot of the analyzer program 
ITT600 (Network analyzer from ABB), with the traffic of the two LANs captured.  
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Figure 42. Captured traffic of LAN A in ITT600. 
 
Figure 43. Captured traffic of LAN B in ITT600. 
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As seen from the figures above, the data flow between DANPs is identical in both 
LANs including PRP supervision frames. A duplicate PRP supervision frame in both 
LANs was analyzed, showing the LAN identification and the sequence number (marked 
with red arrows). The sequence number is the same for both frames, which is one sign 
that the frame is a duplicate. However, the traffic of both LANs can never be 
continuously absolutely identical because of the traffic of SANs (connected to one LAN 
only) and because the traffic generated by switches differs. The traffic of switches was 
filtered from the captures, as the subject for analysis was DANPs only. An Ethernet 
switch can create traffic e.g. Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) messages to 
advertise their identity and capabilities. 
It was noticed during the test that ITT600 cannot retrieve the RCT appended in the 
frames sent by DANPs. It also lacks the PRP version number from the PRP supervision 
frame, but however shows the RCT in these frames. The attribute „IsRedundantFrame‟ 
tell if the frame has RCT appended, showing thus the duplicate handling information. 
6.2.3 Data flow during network failure 
The data flow of DANPs during a network failure should be continuous according to 
PRP specifications (seamless recovery). In this test, the traffic of both networks was 
captured simultaneously while LAN B was simulated to fail for a few seconds. The 
simulation of a short failure was done by resetting all the ports of Ethernet Switch 2 at 
the same time from its operating system. Also during this test the SANs were 
disconnected from the network.  
Figures 44 and 45 present the traffic in the LANs captured with Wireshark. In the test, a 
network failure of about three seconds was simulated in LAN B. As seen in the captured 
figures, the traffic of LAN A flows normally while LAN B has a communication 
breakout in the time of 15:33:23 (red dashed line in Figure 44). The right brace in 
Figure 44 shows the traffic in the LAN A, that is missed from LAN B during failure. 
When the LAN B recovers, a couple of frames have some lost TCP segments, which is 
common when the network starts operating again. After recovery, the data flow is 
identical again. The traffic generated by switches was filtered from the captures. 
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Figure 44. Captured traffic on LAN A in Wireshark. 
 
Figure 45. Captured traffic on LAN B in Wireshark. Communication blackout happens 
in time 15:33:23 and LAN recovers after three seconds. 
Later, a test where the Ethernet switch 2 was completely powered down for a few 
minutes was performed. The system was up and running normally as LAN A was 
carrying the traffic normally during LAN B blackout. 
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6.2.4 Network connection recovery time after failure in a LAN 
The purpose of this test was to measure how long it takes from the traffic to flow again 
in the LAN after recovery from the failure. This was investigated in two cases: In the 
case of Ethernet switch power failure, and in the case of LAN cable failure. 
Firstly, the Ethernet switch power failure was investigated. In practice, the time from 
the start of the blackout to the point when traffic flows again was measured, thus 
presenting the start-up time of the Ethernet switch. This was performed to Ethernet 
switch 1 (LAN A) and for better accuracy, the power blackout simulation was done by 
resetting the switch from the operating system. Figure 46 below shows the traffic flow 
in the LAN A captured with ITT600 during reset. 
 
Figure 46. Capture of traffic in LAN A during switch failure in ITT600. Red dashed 
line shows the failure moment. 
As seen in Figure above, the traffic continues to flow again in about 30 seconds. The 
precise time between the last frame before failure and the first frame after failure was 
30.58 seconds. Later, the switch was powered down and up manually as quickly as 
possible, and the traffic continued after time of 30.82 seconds. It can thus be said that if 
a switch experiences power blackout, the traffic flow in the networks stops at least for 
30 seconds, and more if the power is down longer. As mentioned before, there is a 
reason why the switches in the LANs should not share the same power source. The 
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booting time of switches can however vary depending on the manufacturer and switch 
type; the results of this test were done with RuggedCom RS900NC. 
After the switch power failure, the LAN cable failure was investigated. Here, the time it 
takes to establish connection after connecting the cable to the Ethernet switch was 
measured. This was tested with hot MicroSCADA computer (SYS1), which was set to 
shadow the application state to the stand-by MicroSCADA computer (SYS2). This 
generates a lot of traffic between the HSB computers and makes it thus more accurate to 
measure the connection establish time of one specified port. 
The time for connection establishment on LAN A port of the SYS1 was analyzed by 
resetting the corresponding port it was attached to in Ethernet switch 1 via the operating 
system. Figure 47 below shows the capture of traffic sent by SYS1 (192.168.2.1) during 
the port reset. 
 
Figure 47. Captured traffic of SYS1 in LAN A in Wireshark. Red dashed line shows 
the moment when the port was reset. 
After failure is recovered, connection is established in 2.8 seconds as seen from the 
above Figure. This may however include some time for resetting the port, and is thus 
not very reliable result.  
Later, the test was repeated a couple of times by manually disconnecting and 
reconnecting the cable, as quickly as possible. Here, the measured time for connection 
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establish was approximately 1.8 seconds on every testing time, one of which is shown 
in Figure 48 below.  
 
Figure 48. Captured traffic of SYS1 in LAN A in Wireshark. Red dashed line shows 
the moment when cable was disconnected for as short time as possible. 
This result can still include some time related to disconnecting the port. A measurement 
was done afterwards to roughly estimate the connection opening time. Here, the cable 
was already unplugged, and a time was measured from the time the cable was plugged 
in. The result was that no noticeable delay was detected. A rough guess was made that 
the connection is formed almost immediately, not over the time of 200 ms. It can 
however be a lot more rapid. More accurate measuring devices are needed to measure 
the actual value for connection establishment. 
A conclusion could say that if the connection experience short interruption, the 
connection is up again in less than two seconds after failure (the disconnecting increases 
the time). When cable is plugged in after failure, the connection is made a lot quicker. 
This test was only made with RJ45 (copper) and 100 Mbit port speed, and the result can 
differ with other port types and speeds. 
To increase redundancy and tolerance against LAN cable breaks in one LAN of the PRP 
network, Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol can be used in ring or meshed type LANs. 
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6.2.5 Data flow between SANs 
This test briefly investigated the data flow of SANs in the LANs. In this test, the 
analyzer computer was connected only to Ethernet switch 1 (LAN A) and to a port that 
operates normally (not mirroring). In this way the analyzer computer acts as a normal 
SAN connected to the LAN A. The connection to the SANs was tested by continuously 
pinging them from both MicroSCADA computer (SYS1) and analyzer computer. 
In the test, the SYS1 was set to ping both SANs. It will see the devices in both 
networks. As a compare, the analyzer computer connected only in LAN A was also set 
to ping both SANs. During the pinging, SAN 4 (192.168.2.24) was transferred from 
LAN B to LAN A. Figure 49 shows the ping results of SYS1 (DANP) while Figure 50 
shows the ping results of the analyzer computer (SAN). In this test, a third-party ping 
program was used, providing a timestamp to every packet sent. The sending interval 
was set to one second, and the clocks of the SYS1 and analyzer computer were 
synchronized with NTP. 
   
Figure 49. Snapshot of SYS1 command prompt pinging both SANs.  
As seen in the figure, the DANP has access to SANs connected to either LAN. The 
SAN 4 was transferred from the LAN B to LAN A, and during that time the SAN 
cannot be reached as seen in the rightmost snapshot. When connected to LAN A, it will 
again be online.  
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Figure 50. Snapshot of analyzer computer command prompt pinging both SANs. The 
computer was connected to LAN A. 
When connected to LAN A, the analyzer computer reaches the SAN 3 as normally. It 
cannot reach the SAN 4 connected to LAN B. After the SAN 4 is moved to LAN A, it 
will be reachable as presented in the rightmost snapshot. This is why every SAN that 
needs to communicate with other SANs must be connected to the same LAN, either A 
or B. Alternatively, the SAN can be connected to both LANs through RedBox, which is 
a preferable if the SAN is a crucial component of the network, e.g. single port IED. 
6.2.6 Traffic analysis before and after DuoDriver 
This test analyzed the traffic before and after the DuoDriver of SYS1. The analyzer 
computer was set to capture only the traffic allocated to SYS1 (192.168.2.1) in both 
LANs. At the same time, the analyzer program was set to capture incoming packets in 
SYS1. Thus, three capture sessions were open at the same time. The analyzer computer 
was connected back to the mirroring ports of Ethernet switches. 
The captures are presented in Figure 51 (traffic in LAN A), Figure 52 (traffic in LAN 
B) and in Figure 53, which shows the traffic in SYS1. In the figures, one certain frame 
is also analyzed. For this test, Wireshark was used. 
The transparent reception mode in DuoDriver management GUI enables analyzing the 
RCT in frames after DuoDriver, since this mode does not remove it upon reception. 
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Figure 51. Captured traffic of LAN A in Wireshark. 
 
Figure 52. Captured traffic of LAN B in Wireshark. 
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Figure 53. Captured traffic of SYS1 in Wireshark. 
The above figures show the traffic before and after the DuoDriver of SYS1. It can be 
seen that the duplicates sent by other DANPs (192.168.2.21 and 192.168.2.22) are 
discarded, because only one frame gets through to the application. For example, the 
RCT of analyzed frame (sequence number 28429) in SYS1 tells that it is taken from 
LAN A, and the frame from LAN B is discarded (marked in Fig. 52 with red arrow). 
The duplicate discard algorithm of the DuoDriver accepts the frame that came first and 
discards the later coming duplicate. Frames sent by SANs are received normally, and 
they do not have RCT appended. 
When looking at the capture times of the two LANs, a question arose; why do the 
frames captured from LAN B have a little bit bigger timestamp (however less than a 
millisecond) most of the time? The home page of Wireshark User‟s Guide gives 
information that Wireshark gets the timestamps from the system kernel via WinPcap 
library (special library for packet capturing) and when using USB network interfaces, 
the packets come a little later to the kernel. This can be the reason for LAN B capturing 
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the frames a little later, since a D-Link USB-Ethernet interface was used for LAN B 
captures. (Lamping, Sharpe & Warnicke 2011). 
The analyzer computer time was synchronized to the time of SYS1 using Network Time 
Protocol. The time stamps of the SYS1 are however considerably bigger, which may 
reference to imperfection in the sync resolution or to behavior of the WinPcap library, 
which is affected by many characteristics, e.g. operating system and performance of the 
computer. Thus, the time stamps of the capture files are not millisecond-class 
comparable, when capturing network data of different computers. The order of the 
frames is however fully comparable, which serves this test well. 
After investigating the ingress traffic of SYS1, the egress traffic was captured and 
examined. Again, three captures were made simultaneously; the sent traffic of SYS1 
was captured together with captures of LAN A and LAN B. Figure 54 shows the sent 
traffic (source 192.168.2.1) in SYS1, while Figures 55 and 56 show the data flow in the 
LANs. 
 
Figure 54. Traffic sent from SYS1 in Wireshark. The analyzed frame does not yet have 
RCT appended. 
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Figure 55. Captured traffic of LAN A in Wireshark. 
 
Figure 56. Captured traffic of LAN B in Wireshark. 
In the above figures, a certain frame sent to REF542plus 1 was analyzed. It can be seen 
that after sending and going through DuoDriver, the frame is doubled and a RCT is 
appended after it. The RCT tells the sequence number (42939), LAN identification and 
size field. Also the length of the original frame is grown by 4 octets (32 bits) because of 
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the RCT. Also here, the time stamps of different computers are not precisely 
comparable; actually it seems that a frame was captured in the LAN before it was sent 
by the SYS1. 
Figure 57 shows an analyzed NTP frame sent to SAN (192.168.2.23) in LAN A. Here, 
the RCT is not appended, because the destination is a SAN. 
 
Figure 57. Analyzed frame sent to SAN in LAN A in Wireshark. No RCT appended. 
This test confirmed that DuoDriver acts according to the standard, duplicating the 
frames on egress and discarding the duplicate frame on ingress based on the contents of 
the Redundancy Control Trailer. RCT is not appended if destination is a SAN. 
6.2.7 Interconnecting the LANs 
This test briefly investigates, what happens if the LANs are connected together. This 
should not be done in any case, but it was still tested what happens if it is done. 
Right after connection, the error rate counters of the DANPs started to increase. The 
DuoDriver management GUI has a counter for „Duo Frame received on wrong line‟ 
which increased every second. Shortly, all the connected devices in the network 
disconnected, one by one, resulting in an inoperable network. Sometimes a device came 
back online for a few moments, but lost connection again. Figures 58 and 59 below 
show the traffic in LAN A and LAN B during the connection of the LANs. 
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Figure 58. Captured traffic of LAN A in Wireshark. 
 
Figure 59. Captured traffic of LAN B in Wireshark. 
The above Figures show that ARP is asking for IP addresses, but it seems that it does 
not know which one of the ports to map for the IP address since both ports with same 
MAC addresses are connected to the same network (MAC address conflict). Also the 
frames are sent twice i.e. both LANs carry the two duplicated frames with LAN 
identifications; the frame analyzed in the figures carries LAN A tag on both LANs. The 
connection between LANs thus leads to double addressing and troubles the network. 
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Figure 60 below shows a ping sent to every device in the network from SYS1 during 
LAN connection.  
 
Figure 60. Pinging the devices during LAN A and LAN B connection. 
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This time, only SAN 4 gave reply for the ping, and DANP 2 responded only to one 
packet. This test clearly showed that connecting the two LANs of PRP network will 
lead to a nonworking network, and must thus never be done. 
6.2.8 DuoDriver duplicate accept -mode 
As mentioned before, the DuoDriver can operate in duplicate accept –mode with PRP 
(although not preferred). In this test, the DuoDrivers of MicroSCADA computers were 
set to operate in duplicate accept mode. Afterwards, the traffic sent to SYS2 was 
captured. The HSB shadowing was set on in the test. 
Figures 61 and 62 show the capture of SYS2 with different frames analyzed. A filter 
showing only destination of 192.168.2.2 and multicasted PRP supervision frames was 
used. It can be seen that both of the coming frames are sent to upper levels. In fact, the 
TCP recognizes the duplicate as it is designed to do, coloured black in the figure (TCP 
duplicate ack, or TCP retransmission proposal). No frames have RCT appended. This is 
also true for PRP supervision frames sent by SYS1 (also operated in duplicate accept 
mode). 
 
Figure 61. Captured traffic of SYS1 in Wireshark. PRP supervision frame analyzed. 
No RCT is appended. 
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Figure 62. Captured traffic of SYS1 in Wireshark. TCP frame analyzed. No RCT is 
appended. 
The duplicate accept -method does not discard the duplicate. However, because the 
duplicate is discarded in every case (in the case of TCP), this mode is not preferred. 
Furthermore, because the frames in this mode lack the presence of RCT, error counters 
are not updated if the configuration is done wrongly. All in all, the duplicate discard is 
advantageous to be performed already at the link level (DuoDriver level) since it is 
more efficient way. Therefore, duplicate discard-method should always be used if 
possible. 
6.2.9 MMS traffic with Hot Stand-by 
The last test briefly analyzes the HSB functionality in the IEC 61850 based system and 
if it is correctly configured in the test application. As described in Figure 38 on page 92, 
IEDs should send their MMS reports to both computers‟ OPC servers to make sure that 
no information is lost in the case of switchover, allowing application to continue from 
the same state it was on the computer that failed. The OPC DA clients on the computers 
have adjustable buffers that store the information every time. When the buffer size is 
longer than the switchover time, correct operation is achieved. 
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Figures 63 and 64 show the MMS traffic in LAN A captured with ITT600 and with two 
sequential frames analyzed. ITT600 can decode MMS information, if the correct SCL 
file is loaded, or a connection to IEDs is established. On the contrary, Wireshark cannot 
properly decode MMS information. 
In the figures, the frames analyzed were sent from REF542plus 1 to both MicroSCADA 
computers (192.168.2.21 → 192.168.2.1 and 192.168.2.21 → 192.168.2.2). When 
analyzing the frames, it was noticed that they send the same measurement information 
to different computers. 
 
Figure 63. Traffic of LAN A with an MMS frame analyzed in ITT600. 
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Figure 64. Traffic of LAN A with an MMS frame analyzed in ITT600. 
As seen from the captures and analyzed frame, a measurement value is sent to both 
MicroSCADA computers, with at time interval of about 10 milliseconds, sometimes 
less. The measurement analyzed in the pictures presents the current value of phase A, 
29.033 A (Logical Node UIMMXU1). This is the real value that IED sends and it is a 
good reference to check if there is a problem with measurement scaling in 
MicroSCADA. Other measurement values in the dataset are not sent because only A-
phase is simulated with relay test unit. Every MMS report is sent to both computers, 
providing uninterrupted communication in the case of HSB switchover.  
The HSB switchover was also tested, and it functioned rapidly. The switch-over time 
was noticed to be less than a second. Because of the fact that IEDs send the events to 
both HSB computers and the buffers in OPC DA clients store the changes, no event loss 
happens during switchover. 
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6.3 Conclusions of the test procedure 
The performed test measurements confirmed that the PRP operation with the ABB IEDs 
and MicroSCADA is in accordance with the standard IEC 62439-3 2010. The first two 
tests showed that the structure of the Redundancy Control Trailer and PRP supervision 
frame were according to IEC 62439-3 2010 as well as the identical traffic in the 
networks between doubly attached nodes. The third and fourth test investigated the 
failure of the other LAN of PRP network while the fifth test confirmed the 
communication of singly attached nodes. The traffic analysis before and after 
DuoDriver performed in the sixth test confirmed the operation of DuoDriver accordant 
to the Link Redundancy Entity -layer (described in Chapter 5.2.2) duplicating the 
frames on egress and discarding the frames on ingress. The seventh test examined the 
case if the two LANs were connected, resulting in a non-operable network. The last two 
tests studied the PRP duplicate accept -mode of DuoDriver and a MMS traffic with IEC 
61850 and HSB with a sample.  
As a conclusion of the tests made, we can say that PRP is basically ready to be utilized 
in the projects of the ABB project group. However, the PRP-1 version with its 
modifications to the original standard is worth further investigation, especially to find 
out how it will affect to present devices and systems. In addition, at the time of writing 
this, no RedBoxes are available on the market, and the only protection IEDs that 
support PRP are REF542plus and Relion® 670 series IEDs. 
The PRPs effect on extra work in engineering was quite small when building the test 
network. Because the PRP is operated at the link layer, devices have only one MAC and 
IP address and other network protocols (including GOOSE and Sampled Values) work 
as normally, which makes the engineering more effortless. The additional influence for 
the engineering work is the DuoDriver installation and configuration in MicroSCADA 
computers, and the configuration of supervision of the DuoDriver state to 
MicroSCADA supervision process display. In addition, since the network is doubled, 
the configuration work of the Ethernet switches also doubles. Carefulness is also needed 
in the network configuration with the following rules: not to connect the LANs in any 
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case, and to connect the ports of the devices to right LANs. Luckily, error counters in 
the DuoDriver (both in MicroSCADA computer and REF542plus) will show and detect 
these situations. Also RedBoxes can require some extra configuration work compared to 
normal network with singly attached IEDs. 
It was also discovered that Wireshark used along with ABB ITT600 is good means for 
analyzing IEC 61580 based network traffic. ITT600 can decode the MMS messages for 
further examination, while Wireshark understands almost every known protocol, 
including PRP. While ITT600 is ABB internal only, Wireshark is available for 
everybody to use. 
It is worth mentioning that the DuoDriver installed on the MicroSCADA computer for 
PRP test is not going to work with HSR protocol, because it needs the hardware-
implemented switching logic between the ports. Thus, the MicroSCADA computer 
must be attached through RedBox. One solution with HSR is to connect the 
MicroSCADA computer to two RedBoxes and use NIC teaming for the computer ports. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the redundancy protocols used in IEC 
61850 based substation automation systems. Especially, the new high-availability IEC 
62439 redundancy protocols Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-availability 
Seamless Redundancy (HSR) were investigated, as they will gradually come to use in 
the substation automation projects of the target company. Furthermore, a test procedure 
was performed with PRP to investigate the operation and performance of the protocol 
and what must be taken into consideration when building a PRP system with ABB IEDs 
and MicroSCADA supervision software. In addition, some of the main features of the 
IEC 61850 standard and some reliability aspects were examined. 
First, an overview of IEC 61850 standard was made. IEC 61850 has gained a lot of 
popularity after its publication and is becoming the main standard for substation 
automation. It standardizes the communication inside a substation with objectives for 
device interoperability, free system architectures and long-term stability of the standard. 
The extensions of the standard expand its area outside substation, enabling a way 
towards smart grids. They will also observe substation communication network 
redundancy aspects, which were examined in this thesis. IEC 61850 is an important 
international standard, which will bring improvements in the areas of cost and 
performance for the whole substation automation system. 
After the IEC 61850 overview, the reliability aspects and topologies of a substation 
communication network were discussed. The operation of the substation 
communication network must fulfill the IEC 61850 requirements for communication 
reliability and availability. To enable this, the communication devices in the substation 
are hardened for the industrial environmental conditions and the communication 
network is improved with redundancy protocols and methods. It is crucial to supervise 
the redundancy and its state to gain the full benefit of it. What comes to network 
topologies, the most common one in substation automation at the moment is the ring 
topology, which offers an additional link for redundancy. It was also found out that 
fiber optics should be used as preferred communication media inside substations. 
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The present redundancy protocols and methods were clarified next. The Rapid Spanning 
Tree Protocol (RSTP) has been the most widely used protocol to bring redundancy to 
the communication network. It is implemented to Ethernet switches and effectively 
introduced in ring topology. With efficient implementation and 100 Mbit/s links, it 
provides recovery times of a class of 5 ms per each Ethernet switch in addition to fault 
detection time (also a class of 5 ms). The RSTP is often combined with dual homing 
(NIC teaming) to provide redundant links to end devices, especially with server 
computers. 
The main focus for this thesis was the high-availability redundancy protocols 
standardized in IEC 62439 and adopted by IEC 61850: PRP and HSR. Both the 
protocols provide seamless (0 second) recovery time. The starting point for the usage of 
these protocols is the fact that the reliability of communication network becomes more 
important as the GOOSE messages and especially process bus applications (Sampled 
Values) are used, as their operation depends on the availability of the communication 
network. This is the main reason why there is a need for redundancy protocols with 
more rapid recovery time than RSTP can provide and which can fulfill even the most 
demanding requirements of IEC 61850. 
Both the Parallel Redundancy Protocol and High-availability Seamless Redundancy 
bring a new viewpoint for the redundancy operation compared to RSTP and others. 
Their operation is based on frame duplication and sending over two different paths, 
which has the effect that the message will still get through to the destination if the other 
path gets faulty. While PRP uses two separate LANs as the paths for the message, HSR 
uses the two directions of the ring for redundant communication while not needing 
Ethernet switches at all. It can be said that PRP offers easy connection of non-redundant 
nodes whereas HSR allows cost-effective network solutions. What comes to the 
supervision of redundancy, IEC 61850 objects and Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) together provide a good solution. Also, a new device has been 
introduced to connect devices with one port to redundant networks: Redundancy Box 
(RedBox). 
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After the theoretical investigation of the high-availability redundancy protocols, a test 
procedure of PRP was performed with ABB IEDs and MicroSCADA. Altogether nine 
tests were made to investigate the PRP operation with the help of network analyzer 
software. The test showed that the operation and performance of PRP with ABB IEDs 
and MicroSCADA is accordant with the IEC 62439 standard and that the current 
version of PRP is ready to be utilized in substation automation. Also some early 
experience and information of building such setup was gained.  
Further research could be needed to find out how the IEC 62439 Amendment 1 will 
affect to the present version of PRP. It is probable that the new version will gradually 
replace the older one, as it will also allow the connection between PRP and HSR 
networks. As the HSR is released on the market in the very near future, it is possible to 
investigate and apply it in practice and together with PRP in substation automation 
projects of the project department. The first projects will show more details that must be 
taken into account when using HSR as a redundancy protocol. 
The IEC 61850 redundancy protocols investigated in this thesis are needed to fulfill 
different requirements for redundancy. While the basic level for redundancy is provided 
by RSTP, higher requirements are fulfilled by PRP and HSR that will provide seamless 
recovery. These two protocols do their justice in applications that need high availability 
of the communication network. These are GOOSE messages, and particularly process 
bus communication, which is still awaiting its proper breakthrough in IEC 61850 based 
substation automation systems. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1.   Comparison table of IEC 62439 redundancy protocols  
The table below compares IEC 62439 redundancy protocols along with Spanning Tree 
Protocol, arranged by recovery time. (IEC 62439-1 2010: 23) 
Table 11. Features of IEC 62439 redundancy protocols. 
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APPENDIX 2.  IEC 61850 with MicroSCADA and REF542plus 
The figures below show the components and tools related to engineering of the 
MicroSCADA system as well as REF542plus with IEC 61850 (ABB Oy 2010e: 12) 
 
Figure 65. Data flow in MicroSCADA system with IEC 61850. 
 
Figure 66. REF542plus engineering work flow with IEC 61850 and SCL. Here, the 
station computer COM615 is used. (ABB Oy 2009b).  
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APPENDIX 3.   Stand-by DuoDriver status configuration 
The DuoDriver status information (supervision of the LAN ports) is available after 
DuoDriver installation via OPC Server attributes. The stand-by MicroSCADA 
computer‟s DuoDriver information is practical to implement into the hot application for 
supervision. This appendix shows how the stand-by computer‟s network status 
information to the hot MicroSCADA application was implemented. 
Firstly the DuoDriver and MicroSCADA were installed to the SYS1 computer, the 
application was made and the process objects for protective relays were imported to the 
database from CID file using SCL importer. When importing process objects, the 
„Create Process Objects for DuoDriver Server Status‟ -box was checked in the 
importing options of the SCL importer. This checkbox creates two process objects to 
the process database: SYS_D0001I:P11 for LAN A status and SYS_D0001I:P12 for 
LAN B status. It is preferred to assign DuoDriver an own station. In the test setup, the 
relays were assigned to stations 1–4, and the DuoDriver status of SYS1 was assigned to 
station 5. These process objects were also linked to the supervision picture. 
The DuoDriver status can also be installed using „Install Standard Function‟ -tool in the 
Object Navigator, where DuoDriver Server Status is located under folder „Supervision‟. 
The OPC path for the DuoDriver status is Attributes\DuoDriver\Instance\Line\Working, 
where „Instance‟ is the name given for the network in the DuoDriver installation (Also 
seen in the DuoDriver management GUI) and „Line‟ is the LAN port name (seen e.g. 
from the Windows Network Connections, preferably renamed in the DuoDriver 
installation phase). For the correct operation of DuoDriver, the above mentioned two 
process objects must have the correct station number, OPC path and Block and Object 
Bit addresses. These also have to match in the OPC DA Client to get the information to 
the MicroSCADA and to the supervision display. After this configuration, the 
DuoDriver status information of SYS1 is configured and can be supervised. 
In the test setup, SYS1 network instance name was set to MicroSCADA1 and Line 
names to LAN A and LAN B. Respectively, the network instance name of SYS2 was set 
to MicroSCADA2. 
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After SYS1, the SYS2 was configured. The DuoDriver and MicroSCADA were 
installed, and the OPC Server and External OPC Client were configured. In the SYS2, 
the DuoDriver status was assigned to station 6 to identify it for the SYS2. Also two new 
process objects were created using „Install Standard Function‟ -tool to the database: 
SYS_D0002I:P11 for LAN A status and SYS_D0002I:P12 for LAN B status for the 
SYS2. The main application in both HSB computers is identical.  
Both computers send the DuoDriver status information to each other according to the 
Figure 67 below. A new instance of External OPC Client sends the DuoDriver status to 
other computer, where a new LAN Node is made to receive it. The External OPC DA 
Client can be linked to external MicroSCADA Base System using its IP address under 
the CPI Node Properties -window. STA 1–4 were assigned to IEDs, STA 5 to 
DuoDriver status of SYS1 and STA6 for DuoDriver status of SYS2.  
 
Figure 67. DuoDriver status sending between HSB MicroSCADA computers. 
Regardless of the HSB state (which application is hot and which is cold) the DuoDriver 
status is sent correctly, as they send it to each other all the time. For now, this 
configuration does not correctly take into account the state when both LANs are 
disconnected (connection to the other computer External OPC DA Client is lost; the 
state is not updated). Therefore, it is practical to configure the status information so that 
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in the case of disconnection of both LANs, it is turned to purple (not sampled, no 
information available). The same was considered if the MicroSCADA system of the 
other computer is not running. This can be made e.g. using the Base System Attribute 
BNT (Base System Node Type) of the external HSB system. 
The BNT attribute has the value „SYS‟ if the connection to MicroSCADA Base System 
is established and state „UNKNOWN‟ if it is not. Therefore, a special command 
procedure was made to set the process objects of the external DuoDriver‟s status to „not 
sampled‟ when the state of the external NOD:BNT attribute is „UNKNOWN‟. This 
command procedure is executed every time a NOD-type system event happens as well 
as time intervals of one minute. The command procedure takes into account the current 
hot base system (attribute SYS:BNN). The SCIL code of the command procedure is 
presented below. 
#local this_box, result, status_sys1, status_sys2 
 
result= ops_call("ping -n 2 -w 10 192.168.2.1") 
status_sys1= result.st 
result= ops_call("ping -n 2 -w 10 192.168.2.2") 
status_sys2= result.st 
 
#if SYS:BNN=="SYS1" #then #block 
   #if NOD10:BNT=="UNKNOWN" OR status_sys2==1 #then #block 
      this_box=2 
      #SET SYS_D000'this_box'I:1P11 = LIST(OS = 10, SU = 1) 
      #SET SYS_D000'this_box'I:1P12 = LIST(OS = 10, SU = 1) 
   #block_end 
#block_end 
 
#else_if SYS:BNN=="SYS2" #then #block 
   #if NOD9:BNT=="UNKNOWN" OR status_sys1==1 #then #block 
      this_box=1 
      #SET SYS_D000'this_box'I:1P11 = LIST(OS = 10, SU = 1) 
      #SET SYS_D000'this_box'I:1P12 = LIST(OS = 10, SU = 1) 
   #block_end 
#block_end 
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However, in the test application the NOD:BNT did not work correctly in the situation 
when the LANs were disconnected. For some reason, the value of the attribute does not 
update automatically. Therefore, ping command was added to the procedure to make it 
act correctly, as seen in the above code. Thus, if the NOD:BNT attribute of the external 
application is „UNKNOWN‟ or a ping does not get response, the status of the externa l 
computer‟s DuoDriver is set to „not sampled‟. 
The incorrect behavior of NOD:BNT attribute with DuoDriver is worth further 
investigation. 
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APPENDIX 4.   System overview of PRP test setup 
 
